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THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN ARKANSAS
John J. Watkins*
Ever since the days of John Peter Zenger,1 American journalists
have felt obliged as a matter of conscience to protect the identities of
their confidential sources of information, even at the cost of a stiff fine
or jail term. In one of the more celebrated recent cases, for example,
New York Times reporter Myron Farber spent forty days in jail and
was fined $2,000 after refusing to honor a defense subpoena in a sensational murder case, and his newspaper was fined $285,000.2 Not surprisingly, journalists have long attempted to secure protection for their
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. B.J. 1970, M.A. 1971, J.D.
1976, University of Texas. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Robert A.
Leflar in making available material from his files and in reviewing portions of the draft, as well as
the contributions of his research assistants, Mima C. Wallace and Kathleen Brandon.
I. Zenger, the printer, publisher and editor of the New York Weekly Journal, was jailed in
1734 and charged with criminal libel on the basis of articles critical of William Cosby, the colonial governor. Imprisoned for nine months because of his inability to post bond prior to his trial,
Zenger steadfastly refused to reveal the names of individuals who wrote for the Journal, even
though Cosby had offered a reward of fifty pounds for the identity of the author of the allegedly
libelous articles. Zenger was ultimately tried and acquitted, thanks to an emotional appeal to the
jury by noted lawyer Andrew Hamilton, and his refusal to "name names" was not an issue at
trial. C. WHALEN, YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 12 (1973).
2. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). Just before
leaving office in early 1982, Governor Brendan Byrne of New Jersey pardoned Farber and the
Times and ordered the return of $101,000 in fines collected for criminal contempt. The fines
imposed for civil contempt were unaffected by the pardon. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW

79 (2d ed. 1982).
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sources, arguing in court for a "reporter's privilege" under the common
law and the first amendment and lobbying in state legislatures for passage of so-called "shield laws."
Arkansas is one of twenty-six states3 which has such a statute, and
that provision 4-- one of the oldest in the nation-is the subject of this
article. Because only two reported cases 5 provide any guidance with
respect to the act's application, statutes and case law from other jurisdictions will also be examined. Before turning to the legal issues, however, it is appropriate to consider briefly the history of the fight for
protection of confidential sources and the circumstances surrounding
passage of the Arkansas statute.
I.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Although John Peter Zenger refused to reveal the authors of allegedly libelous stories published in his newspaper in 1734, he faced no
penalty for that refusal; indeed, he was already in jail awaiting a trial
on criminal libel charges.6 It was not until 1848 that a reporter was
jailed for protecting his confidential sources. John Nugent of the New
York Herald secured and sent to his editor a copy of ihe confidential
draft of a proposed treaty to end the Mexican-American War. The
United States Senate, which has been debating the treaty in secret session, subpoenaed Nugent and demanded that he reveal his source. The
reporter refused and was jailed. Refusing Nugent's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, a federal circuit court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Senate's contempt order and did not reach the
3.

12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); ARIz. REV.
12-2214, 12-2237 (1982 & Supp. 1983-84); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Repl.
1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326
(1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. §
34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, §§
1451-1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901-903 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144--20-147 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21-21.9 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1983-84); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12
(Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1-.1-3 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980). In California, the privilege is also embodied in the state
constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977).
ALA. CODE §

STAT. ANN. §§

5. Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978); Williams v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
6. See supra note 1.
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privilege issue.7 More than a dozen similar incidents took place over
the next thirty years,8 and legislative subpoenas directed at journalists

have been fairly common during this century.9

Most of the battles over source confidentiality, however, have been
fought in the courts, which have uniformly held that no privilege for
journalists existed at common law.10 The earliest reported case apparently is People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher,1 decided by a New York
court in 1874. There, one Shanks, city editor of the New York Tribune,
was subpoenaed by a county grand jury in connection with an allegedly
libelous article published by his newspaper. The grand jury sought the
name of the article's author, having in mind an indictment against him
fore criminal libel, but Shanks refused to answer on the ground that
the newspaper's regulations prohibited such disclosure. Shanks was
then reported to the local court, which held him in contempt and ordered that he be committed until he saw fit to purge himself of his
contumacy by answering the question. Sustaining the contempt citation, the supreme court made plain that the question propounded to
Shanks was indeed proper: "As the law now is, and has for ages ex7. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375).
8. C. WHALEN, supra note 1,at 21. For example, in 1857 the House of Representatives
found in contempt a New York Times reporter who had written a story revealing that bribes were
being taken by congressmen for votes on certain land grant measures. James W. Simonton, called
before a House committee investigating the charges, explained that he could not answer the committee's questions "without a dishonorable breach of confidence." CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d
Sess. 403 (1857). The full House rejected his claim of privilege and ordered him into the custody
of the sergeant-at-arms for the remainder of the session. Id. at 411-13, 426. The committee, however, became convinced that Simonton would never reveal his sources and recommended his discharge. The House adopted the committee's recommendation, and the reporter was released after
nineteen days in custody. Id. at 630. In addition, the committee determined that the charges were
true without relying on Simonton's sources and recommended the explusion of three House members, who then resigned. C. WHALEN, supra note 1,at 21.
9. For example, in 1951 a Senate subcommittee subpoenaed a Providence Journal reporter
who had written articles concerning the subcommittee's investigation of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Twenty years later, a House subcommittee subpoenaed Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, and demanded that he produce all materials CBS used in producing
the controversial television documentary "The Selling of the Pentagon." C. WHALEN, supra note
1,at 27-28.
10. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Joslyn v.
People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii 475 (Dist. Ct. 1914); In re
Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); Clinton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 11 Ohio Dec.
603 (1901); Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,
48 P. 75 (1897); People ex rel Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). See generally
D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 307 (1969); Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950); Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to
Withhold Sources of Information from the Court, 45 YALE L.J. 357 (1935).
II. 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
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isted, no court could possibly hold that a witness could legally refuse to
give the name of the author of an alleged libel, for the reason that the
rules of a public journal forbade it." 1 2
Journalists asserted a variety of additional arguments in other
cases but met with the same lack of success. Probably the most frequent defense was based on a "canon of journalistic ethics" prohibiting
a newsman from revealing a confidential source. In a 1914 case, an
Hawaii court gave short shrift to this contention:
[T]he position of the witness is untenable. Though there is a canon of
journalistic ethics forbidding the disclosure of a newspaper's source of
information,-a canon worthy of respect and undoubtedly wellfounded, it is subject to a qualification: It must yield when in conflict
with the interests involved of justice,-the private interests involved
must yield to the interests of the public."3
The same argument was rejected by a New Jersey court, which observed that "[t]o admit of any such privilege would be to shield the real
transgressor and permit him to go unwhipped of justice."'" Other de15
fenses were also greeted with hostility in early decisions.
With the courts steadfastly declining to recognize a testimonial
privilege for journalists, it was left to the legislatures to provide protection for confidential sources. Maryland became the first state to enact a
12. Id. at 230.
13. In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii 475, 476 (Dist. Ct. 1914).
14. In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 236, 85 A. 1012 (1913).
15. See, e.g., Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919) (self-incrimination); Plunkett
v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911) (forfeiture of estate). Under the forfeiture argument,
a reporter would contend that to reveal a source would cause him to lose his means of earning a
living. Obviously, this approach is closely related to the "employer regulations" argument advanced and rejected in People ex rel.
Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). See
supra text accompanying notes 11-12. The self-incrimination defense was successful in Burdick v.
United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), in which the city editor of the New York Tribune refused to
reveal to a grand jury his source of information for a series of articles on customs fraud on the
ground that the answer tended to incriminate him. President Wilson granted Burdick a full pardon, but the journalist refused it. After a federal district court held him in contempt for refusing
to answer under these circumstances, the Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the editor's original
defense.
In later cases, reporters also raised first amendment and relevancy defenses. The constitutional
issue is considered at text accompanying notes 61-94, infra. As for the relevancy approach, journalists typically contended that the confidential information sought was irrelevant or immaterial to
the proceedings. See, e.g., In re Goodfader's Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Hawaii 1961) (holding that
information could be considered likely enough to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence);
Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957) (although identity of
writer of memorandum which prompted an editorial might not be admissible in libel action, it was
relevant because it might lead to evidence of malice); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (neither information nor its source was relevant to main proceeding).

1984]

JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE

shield law, passing such a statute in 1896 after a journalist was jailed
for refusing to reveal a source. In early 1896, John T. Morris, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, published an article suggesting that certain elected officials and policemen were being paid by illegal gambling
establishments. The article contained information virtually identical to
testimony received previously by a grand jury investigating such corruption. Suspecting a leak, the grand jury summoned Morris and demanded that he divulge his source. The reporter refused and was imprisoned. Although he was released from jail five days later when the
grand jury's term expired, the Journalists' Club, an organization of
newsmen, became alarmed at the prospect of reporters having to choose
between imprisonment and protection of their confidential sources. The
group persuaded the General Assembly to enact protective legislation,"
which provided:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or
journal shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial
or before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of
any news or information procured or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper on and in which he is engaged, connected with
or employed. 7
To note that the statute was not well received in legal circles
would be a considerable understatement. A lawyer wrote in 1897 that
Maryland has "a statute making the most irresponsible tramp reporter
a privileged person in the matter of communications the same as doctors and lawyers."' 8 Professor Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, described the Maryland statute "as detestable in substance as it is crude
in form," pointing out that "for more than three centuries, it has been
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public is entitled to every
man's evidence." He also predicted that the law would "probably remain unique."' 19
Professor Wigmore's forecast initially proved accurate, for the
Maryland statute stood alone for more than thirty- years. During the
16. This account of the Morris case and subsequent legislative activity is taken from Bortz &
Bortz, "Pressing" Out the Wrinkles in Maryland's Shield Law for Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L.
REV. 461, 461-62 (1979). See also Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983);
Steigleman, Newspaper Confidence Laws-Their Extent and Provisions, 20 JOURN. Q. 230
(1943).
17. Law of April 2, 1896, ch. 249, 1896 MD. LAWS 437, quoted in Bortz & Bortz, supra note
16, at 462 n. 10.
18. Garnsey, The Demand for Sensational Journals, 18 ARENA 683 (Nov. 1897), quoted in
Steigleman, supra note 16, at 233.
19. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (2d ed. 1923).
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period 1929 to 1935, however, there arose five highly publicized cases
in which newsmen were jailed after refusing to reveal confidential
sources,2 0 and these decisions provided the impetus for legislative action. The most significant of the cases was People ex rel. Mooney v.
21
Sheriff
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in January 1936.
Martin Mooney, a reporter for the New York American, had written a
series of articles revealing that illegal gambling was flourishing despite
clean-up attempts. Called before a grand jury investigating the numbers racket, Mooney refused to provide the names of his sources for the
stories. Affirming a fine of $250 and a prison term of thirty days, the
Court of Appeals squarely rejected Mooney's arguments that he was
protected by a privilege:
The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting of a
privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to that general
rule. In the administration of justice, the existence of the privilege
from disclosure as it now exists often, in particular cases, works a
hardship. The tendency is not to extend the classes to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, but to restrict that privilege. On reason and authority, it seems clear that this court should not now depart
from the general rule

. . .

and create a privilege in favor of an addi-

tional class. If that is to be done, it should be done by the
2
Legislature ....
20. Only one of the cases is reported. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199
N.E. 415 (1936). The other four cases are discussed in Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain
from Divulging the Sources of His Information, supra note 10, at 71-73. The first of the cases
involved three Washington Times reporters who were sentenced to 45 days in jail in 1929 when
they refused to reveal to a District of Columbia grand jury the sources of a story about bootlegging. In 1931, a Virginia editor refused to respond to a grand jury's request for the name of a
letter writer who had criticized the local corporation court. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail for
contempt but was released after serving only five. The other two cases arose in Kentucky in 1934.
In the first, the editor of the Louisville Courier-Journalrefused to tell a legislative committee the
name of a state legislator who had written a letter to the paper satirizing legislative procedure.
The second case involved two reporters for the Danville Advocate held in contempt and sentenced
to jail for their refusal to provide a court of inquiry with information on the hanging in effigy of a
state legislator. Id.
21. 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). The case received considerable treatment in the law
reviews. See, e.g., Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 115 (1936); Note, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1936); Note,
34 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1936); Note, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1936); Note, 11 Wis. L. REV. 576
(1936). Most of these commentators agreed with the Mooney court. See, e.g., Note, 84 U. PA. L.
REV. 798 (1936) (extension of privilege to journalists "would be unwarranted"). One writer, however, argued for a qualified statutory privilege for newsmen. Note, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1936).
22. 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. at 416. The court's comments echo those made thirty years
before in a law review article: "Privilege, the exception of a person or class from the common rule,
if not an abuse in its inception is proverbially sure to become one. The less there is of it under a
reign of law the better." Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 388 (1906).
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Following this flurry of judicial hostility to the privilege, seven
states enacted shield laws during the period 1933 to 1937, and three
more passed such statutes by 1943.23 Arkansas became the sixth state
in the nation to offer such statutory protection for journalists when the
voters approved an initiated act on November 3, 1936,24 only ten
months after the Mooney decision. Unlike the Maryland act, which
was prompted by the Morris case, 25 or the Kentucky statute, which
followed two widely-publicized cases in that state, 26 the Arkansas law
was apparently not the product of a specific incident involving a jailed
Arkansas journalist. Instead, it was part of a comprehensive criminal
law reform package supported by the Arkansas Bar Association.
The reform movement began at the annual session of the bar association in 1934, when Abe Collins of DeQueen, chairman of the Committee on Law and Law Reform, presented a report recommending a
complete overhaul of the state's code of criminal procedure. The report,
which was unanimously adopted by the membership, called upon the
governor to appoint a committee to redraft the criminal code. On October 29, 1934, Governor J.M. Futrell established the Arkansas Criminal
Law Reform Commission, composed of Collins, Professor Robert A.
Leflar of the University of Arkansas School of Law, Judge B.E. Isbell
of DeQueen, Judge W. J. Waggoner of Lonoke, and W.G. Dinning of
Helena. At its initial meeting, the Commission named Collins as chair7
man and Leflar as secretary.
Having examined a variety of sources, including the American
Law Institute's 1931 Model Code of Criminal Procedure, the Commission prepared a constitutional amendment and two lengthy statutes
(containing twenty-five and fifty-seven sections) for introduction in the
1935 session of the General Assembly.2 8 Among the proposed statutory
provisions was a shield law for newspapermen, 9 but the proposals pri23. The states passing such statutes and the year in which they were enacted are: New Jersey
(1933); Alabama (1935); California (1935); Kentucky (1936); Arkansas (1936); Arizona (1937);
Pennsylvania (1937); Indiana (1941); Ohio (1941); Montana (1943). Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, supra note 10, at 61 n. 1.
24. Initiated Act No. 3, § 15 (Nov. 3, 1936), reprinted in 1937 ARK. AcTs 1384, 1391. The
Kentucky privilege statute, also passed in 1936, preceded the Arkansas act by just over eight
months. 1936 Ky. AcTs. ch. 29, at 73-74.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
26. See supra note 20.
27. Leflar, The Arkansas Criminal Law Reform Movement in 1934-36, 5 ARK. HIST. Q. 1,
2-3 (1946).
28. Id. at 4-5.
29. S. 203, 50th Gen. Assembly § 20 (1935). The bill provided:
Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper or periodical, or a pub-
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marily dealt with more fundamental criminal law matters such as sentencing, change of venue, the insanity defense, perjury, habitual offenders, and criminal procedure. 30 Despite intensive lobbying by
Commission members and the editorial support of newspapers through31
out the state, none of the statutory measures passed the legislature.
The principal opponents of the reform package were criminal defense
lawyers who believed that the interests of their clients would be adversely affected by the changes.32
After this legislature defeat, the Arkansas Bar Association
adopted a resolution continuing the Commission and instructing it to
prepare an initiated act containing the gist of the proposals that had
failed to pass the General Assembly. A year later, at the Association's
1936 meeting, the Commission was directed to proceed with the initiated act so that it might be presented to the voters the following November. Soon thereafter a drive was begun to collect the necessary signatures to place the measure on the ballot, and the effort generated
about twenty-five percent more than the 11,000 required names. The
act drew the support of Governor Futrell, Governor-designate Carl Bailey, Attorney General-designate Jack Holt, and other state leaders, as
well as that of the Arkansas Gazette and other newspapers. 33 Opposition proved negligible, and the initiated act and a related constitutional
34
amendment passed overwhelmingly.
Section 15 of the new act, entitled "newspaper privilege,"
provided:
Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper or periodical, or publisher of any newspaper or periodical, shall be required
to disclose to any grand jury, or to any other authority, the source of
the information used as the basis for any article he may have written
lisher of any newspaper or periodical shall be required to disclose to any grand jury, or
to any other authority, the source of the information used as the basis for any article he
may have written or published, it must be shown that such article was not written and
published in good faith, without malice, and in the interest of the public welfare.

Id.
30. Leflar, supra note 27, at 5, 8-23 (summarizing key provisions of the bills).
31. Id. at 5, 7-8. However, a constitutional amendment that embodied two of the four provisions drafted by the Commission was passed by both houses and signed by the governor. Id. at 5.
The amendment, which permitted criminal prosecutions by information as well as indictment and
placed prosecuting attorneys on a salary instead of a fee basis, was approved by the voters on
November 3, 1936. See ARK. CONsT. amend. 21.
32. Leflar, supra note 27, at 7.
33. Id. at 23-24.
34. The intiated act passed by a margin of 121,310 to 29,181, while the constitutional
amendment, described in note 31, supra, passed by a vote of 112,705 to 36, 262. Both measures
were approved in 74 of the state's 75 counties. Leflar, supra note 27, at 24.
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or published, it must be shown that such article was written and published in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public
welfare.35

This provision was drafted for the Commission by Judge Isbell, a former circuit judge then in private practice in DeQueen.36 He had prepared a similar version for inclusion in the bill that failed to pass the
1935 General Assembly. 7 Other members of the Criminal Law Reform Commission were not as enthusiastic about the shield law as
Judge Isbell. Commenting upon a proposed draft of the bill to be introduced in the 1935 legislature, Judge W.J. Waggoner of Lonoke wrote
Dr. Leflar that "I doubt the wisdom of [the privilege for journalists],
but have no special opposition to it."'3 8 After the legislature killed the
reform package, the Commission resurrected key portions of the bill in
the form of the initiated act. Some sections of the bill were eliminated,
and Dr. Leflar wrote Commission Chairman Collins suggesting that the
shield provision could also be deleted. "I still do not believe that [it] is
very important," Dr. Leflar wrote. "It might well be left in if anything
could be gained by way of newspaper support of our program by leav'39
ing it in."
The Commission certainly pointed to the privilege section when
urging newspapers around the state to endorse the initiated act. A form
letter sent to editors over the signature of Chairman Collins solicited
their assistance in explaining the proposals to the voters and noted that
the initiated act included a provision that "extends the privilege as to
confidential communications to include newspaper men on the same ba35. Initiated Act of Nov. 3, 1936, No. 3, § 15, reprinted in 1937 ARK. ACTS 1384, 1391.
36. A memorandum in the files of Dr. Leflar indicates that Judge Isbell drafted the provision
to "create priv. for editors, reporters, etc." See "Summary of proposals agreed upon by Criminal
Procedure Reform Committee, with suggestions for grouping for enactment" (undated), files of
Dr. Robert A. Leflar University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. Material from Dr. Leflar's files-an invaluable research source-is hereinafter identified as from the "Leflar Files."
37. The text of the original bill, reproduced supra note 29, varies little from that of the
initiated act. The major change, apparently made at the behest of Dr. Leflar, was in the final
clause. The 1935 bill stated that the privilege is lost if it is shown "that the article was not written
and published in good faith, without malice, and in the interest of the public welfare." S. 203,
50th Gen. Assembly § 15 (1935). Dr. Leflar's files contain an undated note with respect to an
early draft of the initiated act suggesting that the Commission "[tiry to re-phrase 'in good faith
and without malice, not in the interest of the public welfare.' " Subsequently, Dr. Leflar sent to all
members of the Commission a revised draft of the entire act that included a revised privilege
provision containing the language as ultimately adopted. Enclosure in letter from Dr. Robert A.
Leflar to Abe Collins, B.E. Isbell, W.J. Waggoner and W.G. Dinning (May 7, 1936), Leflar Files.
38. Letter from Judge W.J. Waggoner to Dr. Robert A. Leflar (Jan. 7, 1935), Leflar Files.
39. Letter from Dr. Robert A. Leflar to Abe Collins (May 18, 1935), Leflar Files.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:473

sis as lawyers, physicians and ministers. ' 40 Dr. Leflar later observed
that "[i]nclusion of the section may also have been influenced by a
desire to secure active newspaper support for the reform act as a
whole."

41

There apparently was no single incident in Arkansas that convinced Judge Isbell and the Commission of the need for the reporter's
privilege. Indeed, it appears that the group was influenced by two 1934
episodes in Kentucky that resulted in the jailing of journalists.4 2 As
part of its effort to convince the voters of the need for reform, the Commission prepared a "source book" about the initiated act for distribution to newspapers, lawyers, and others who might support the measure. 43 The source book included a brief summary of each of the act's
provisions and an illustration indicating how that particular section
would operate in practice. 4" An early draft of the illustration accompanying the explanation of the journalist's privilege told of a "newspaper
reporter in Kentucky [who] learned of certain corrupt arrangements
between public officials and professional criminals. '45 In the final ver40. Form letter from Abe Collins to newspaper editors (Sept. 24, 1936), Leflar Files. In
contrast, a pamphlet written by Collins-and published at his own expense-for distribution to
the general public did not mention the reporter's privilege in explaining the act's provisions. Enclosure in letter from Abe Collins to Dr. Robert A. Leflar (undated), Leflar Files. See also Arkansas
Gazette, Nov. I, 1936, at 5 (reprinting the pamphlet).
41. Leflar, The Criminal Procedure Reforms of 1936-Twenty Years After, 11 ARK. L.
REV. 117, 126 n.42 (1957).
42. See supra note 20.
43. Leflar, supra note 27, at 8. The source book was the idea of J.N. Heiskell, editor of the
Arkansas Gazette. Letter from Abe Collins to Dr. Robert A. Leflar (July 8, 1936), Leflar Files.
The letter states in part:
[Mr. Heiskell] wants us to get up a kind of "Source Book" designed for use by editors
and speakers and suggests that we have it mimeographed. He is anxious to have one of
these as soon as possible . . . .It is his idea that the explanation of each of the divisions of our bill should be accompanied by some illustration like Judge Isbell's hog
stealing case in this county. He thinks that illustrations like this will do more to grip the
attention and convince the voters of the merits of our proposals than anything else. I
have asked Judge Isbell to go to work on these illustrations at once.
Id. The Gazette and other newspapers printed a series of columns based on the source book prior
to the November election. See, e.g., The Way the Law Now Works, Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 18,
1936, at I; Arkansas Law and a Hog, Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 19, 1936, at I. Interestingly, the
Gazette, did not include a column on the reporter's privilege provision.
44. Arkansas Criminal Law Reform Commission, Source Book for use of Editors and Speakers (undated), Leflar Files. Substantial portions of the source book are reproduced in Leflar, supra
note 27, at 8-23.
45. Draft of "Source Book for use of Editors and Speakers," (undated), Leflar Files. Because
Judge Isbell drafted the privilege provision itself, it would be logical to assume that he also provided the accompanying illustration. The matter is not entirely clear, however. The initial plan
was to base the source book on the Commission's report to the Governor, which Dr. Leflar had
prepared, with Judge Isbell to provide illustrations showing how the changes would work in spe-

1984]

JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE

sion of the source book, the reference to Kentucky had been changed to
simply "another state."" Moreover, the illustration sounds very much
like it could have been based on the Mooney case in New York, decided in January 1936. It stated:
A newspaper reporter in another state learned of certain corrupt arrangements between public officials and professional criminals. He
could not secure full details until he promised his informant not to
reveal his name. After making the promise, his newspaper published
stories which aroused public opinion against the corruption exposed.
In a subsequent grand jury investigation the reporter was called upon
to disclose the source of his information and upon his refusal was sent
to jail by the court for contempt. Unwilling to promise further secrecy
to his informant, he was, of course, unable to secure additional information and the campaign against the corruption had to be dropped. A
judge in Arkansas, as the law now stands, however much he may have
sympathized with the reporter would. have been compelled to have
7
done the same.

The source book also focused on the limited nature of the privilege
and its perceived value in assisting the press in investigating criminal
activity.
This section would not render newspaper men incompetent to testify concerning communications to them, but would only permit them
to refuse to reveal the sources of information upon which articles written or published by them are based in their discretion. Such a change
in the law seems to be generally favored, and it is thought would enable newspaper men to secure information of wrong doing that is now
cific fact situations. Letter from Abe Collins to Dr. Robert A. Leflar (July 8, 1936), Leflar Files.
However, later correspondence makes clear that Dr. Leflar drafted some of the illustrations, although most of these were eliminated by Mr. Collins and Judge Isbell. Letter from Abe Collins to
Dr. Robert A. Leflar (Sept. 17, 1936), Leflar Files. In the same letter, Collins also noted: "[Y]ou
will find that in the main, we have used the 'Source Book' practically as prepared by you." Id.
With characteristic modesty, Dr. Leflar subsequently attributed the "major part" of the drafting
to Collins. Leflar, supra note 27, at 23 n.9a. A draft of the source book suggests that the privilege
illustration was prepared by Dr. Leflar, for the illustration was typed on a different typewriter
than other portions of the document and was edited, along with the paragraph explaining the
privilege, in Dr. Leflar's hand. Draft of "Source Book for use of Editors and Speakers," (undated), Leflar Files. Upon reviewing the draft during the preparation of this article, Dr. Leflar
said that the illustration was typed on his typewriter but could not recall whether he had originally drafted the illustration or had merely put it in final form.
46. "Source Book for use of Editors and Speakers," supra note 44, at 13.
47. Id. This illustration does not appear in Dr. Leflar's review of the Commission's work. See
Leflar, supra note 27. The reference in the illustration to the then-current Arkansas law was
presumably a reference to the prevailing common law view that no reporter's privilege existed, for
there are no reported Arkansas cases on the issue.
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difficult. This is offered for the public welfare and is not a shield for
dishonest newspapers. It recognizes newspaper writing as a profession
and places newspaper men in the same position as lawyers, physicians,
48
and ministers.

Elaborating on this rationale several years later, Dr. Leflar explained that the privilege would tend to increase the number of successful criminal prosecutions. "The Commission was convinced that undercover criminal activities which might have political or economic
protection in a community were more likely to be brought to light, and
ultimately prosecuted, if news reporters were given the freedom which
the section authorizes."' 9
Thirteen years after the voters approved the initiated act, the General Assembly amended the shield statute to include radio journalists,
making Arkansas the first state to so extend the privilege. 50 Act 254 of
1949 amended the statute to read as follows, and it remains unchanged
today:
Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper or periodical, or radio station, or publisher of any newspaper or periodical or
manager or owner of any radio station, shall be required to disclose to
any Grand Jury or to any other authority, the source of information
used as the basis for any article he may have written, published or
broadcast, it must be shown that such article was written, published
or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the
public welfare.8 1

The legislation, sponsored by Senator J. Pat Garner of Sebastian
48. "Source book for use of Editors and Speakers," supra note 44, at 12-13. This description
of the provision is reproduced in Leflar, supra note 27, at 12-13. The Commission's comment that
"[s]uch a change in the law seems to be generally favored" seems something of an overstatement.
For example, a commentator discussing the Mooney decision wrote that "[a] reading of almost
any daily newspaper will demonstrate that the additional news such a privilege would admit would
be of slight value." Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 115, 118 (1936). Professor Wigmore's views on the
subject have already been noted. See supra text accompanying note 19. Moreover, Illinois Governor Horner, vetoing a newsman's privilege bill in July 1935, said in his veto message: "1 believe
that if this bill becomes law it would work a great injury to the administration of justice. It
disregards sound legal principles, has no basis in justice and might lead to a great abuse."
Steigleman, supra note 16, at 234. Although four states had adopted shield laws in the three-year
period preceding approval of the Arkansas statute in 1936, see supra note 23, an effort to pass a
federal statute failed in 1929, as did attempts to pass legislation in New York (1930) and Texas
(1931). Steigleman, supra note 16, at 234.
49. Leflar, supra note 41, at 126.
50. Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, supra note 10, at 64.
51. 1949 ARK. AcTs 254, § 1,at 761-62 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977)).
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County,52 a radio news editor himself,53 sailed through the Senate 27-0
and the House 73-2.1" Governor Sid McMath signed the measure into
law on March 8, 1949. 55
By 1950, only one other state, Michigan, had enacted a shield
statute, bringing the total to twelve," and the privilege issue was relatively dormant until the 1960's, when the number of subpoenas issued
against reporters increased dramatically. During the first two and onehalf years of the Nixon administration, for example, 124 subpoenas
were served on CBS and NBC, thirty on the Chicago Sun-Times and
the Chicago Daily News, and thirty on the Los Angeles Times.57 The
first major use of subpoenas came in connection with the 1969 trial of
the so-called "Chicago Seven," 5 the antiwar activists charged with inciting a riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.
The government served subpoenas on all four major Chicago daily
newspapers, the three commercial television networks, and Newsweek,
Time and Life magazines, demanding all of their notes, film footage,
stories, rough drafts59 and any other materials in their possession relating
to the Convention.
Not surprisingly, seven more states passed shield statutes in the
period 1964 to 1971. 60 At the same time, however, journalists were
turning toward a first amendment argument in support of a privilege to
protect confidential sources. Without such a privilege, they contended,
sources would be unwilling to provide information to reporters, and this
practical restraint on the flow of news to the media would in turn de52. Senator Garner introduced S. 187 on February 7, 1949. ARK. DAILY LEGIs. DIG., 57th
Gen. Assembly 123 (Feb. 7, 1949).
53. ARK. DAILY LEGIS. DIG., 57th Gen. Assembly (1949). Not surprisingly, the Arkansas
Broadcasters Association heartily endorsed the bill. See ABA Seeks Protection of News Source,
Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 18, 1949, at 18.
54. ARK. DAILY LEGIs. DIG., 57th Gen. Assembly 156, 274 (Feb. 10, Mar. 1, 1949). Because
the bill amended an initiated act, a two-thirds vote in each house was necessary. See ARK. CONST.
amend. 7.
55. ARK. DAILY LEGIs. DIG., 57th Gen. Assembly 312 (Mar. 8, 1949).
56. Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, supra note 10, at 61 n.l. The Michigan Statute was passed in 1949. Id.
57. Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg The Case for a Federal Shield
Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 162 n. 13 (1976).
58. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973).
59. Comment, supra note 57, at 162.
60. C. Whalen, supra note 1, at 171. The states were: Louisiana (1964), Nevada (1969),
New Mexico (1969), New York (1970), Alaska (1970), Rhode Island (1971), and Illinois (1971).
The Whalen book includes California in this group, but that state initially passed a shield law in
1935. See supra note 23.
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prive the public of important information. 1 This theory was initially
tested in Garland v. Torre,"2 a 1958 defamation case in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a qualified first amendment
privilege for journalists. Justice Potter Stewart, then a circuit judge,
wrote for a unanimous court that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources . . .may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news."6' He
added, however, that the privilege is not absolute and must be balanced
against "the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the
witness .. ."" Because in Garland the information sought "went to
the heart of the plaintiff's claim," Justice Stewart concluded that the
balance must be struck in favor of disclosure. 65 Other courts, however,
took a dim view of Garland's first amendment analysis, holding that
the Constitution offered no "shield," absolute or qualified, to the reporter who sought to protect the identity of a confidential source.6 6
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in
Branzburg v. Hayes,6 7 a 1972 decision involving four cases in which
journalists who had personally observed potentially criminal activity
were subpoenaed to testify before grand juries. 68 The Court, in an opin61. See generally Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 N.W. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
62. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
63. Id. at 548.
64. id.
65. Id. at 550. Justice Stewart emphasized that this case did not involve "the use of the
judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of news" or a
news source "of doubtful relevance or materiality." Id. at 549-50.
66. See. e.g., In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa.
32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968). Contra Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert. dismissed,
402 U.S. 901 (1971) (recognizing first amendment privilege, but holding that need for source's
identity went to heart of claim); State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971) (first
amendment privilege overcome by grand jury's need for the information).
67. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68. Two of the cases arose when a Louisville Courier-Journalreporter's stories on drug use
in the area made clear that he had personally observed the making of hashish and had watched
drug users smoke marijuana. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970);
Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). In the third case, a Massachusetts
television newsman had recorded and photographed Black Panther officials preparing for an anticipated police raid, although he prepared no story on the matter. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266
N.E.2d 297 (1971). In all three cases, the state courts rejected the journalists' first amendment
claims. The fourth case, which attracted the most attention, involved a black New York Times
reporter who had covered the Black Panthers and other militant groups on the West Coast. He
was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury and to bring with him notes and recordings
of interviews with Black Panther leaders. Recognizing a qualified first amendment privilege, the
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ion by Justice White, held 5-4 that the reporters had no first amendment privilege to refuse to respond to the grand juries' inquiries or to
refuse to appear before such bodies. Although the White opinion
squarely rejected an absolute privilege, 69 it acknowledged in principle
that newsgathering is a protected first amendment activity and left
room for development of a qualified privilege for protection of confidential sources.70 The concurring opinion of Justice Powell, who provided
the crucial fifth vote, offered even more hope, as he took pains to emphasize the limited nature of the Court's holding and his view that an
"asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of
all citizens to give relevent testimony with respect to criminal
conduct.'
While the Powell opinion is somewhat opaque, at least five members of the Court-Powell plus the four dissenters-recognized a first
amendment privilege in Branzburg.72 Some commentators thus described Justice White's opinion as one for the "plurality" and focused
instead upon Justice Powell's concurrence and Justice Stewart's dissent
for guidance as to the nature and scope of the first amendment protection for confidential sources. 73 Although Justice Powell was noncommittal in this regard, Justice Stewart was quite specific. He wrote:
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of the law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destrucNinth Circuit Court of Appeals held that absent a compelling showing of need by the government,
the reporter need not even appear before the grand jury, much less answer its question. Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
69. 408 U.S. at 702.
70. Justice White wrote that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated," 408 U.S. at 681, and that "[o]fficial harassment of the press
undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his
news sources would have no justification .. " Id. at 707-08. Moreover, he restricted the Court's
opinion to the grand jury context, stating that the "sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas . . .and to answer questions relevant to an investigation
into the commission of a crime." Id. at 682. Finally, Justice White noted the "uncertainty" of the
effect of confidential relationships on the flow of news, suggesting that newsmen lost their claim of
privilege because of their failure to carry a burden of proof. Id. at 691, 693.
71. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Justice Stewart, author of the Garland opinion, wrote the principal dissent, in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. 408 U.S. at 725. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate
opinion, taking the position that the first amendment confers an absolute privilege. Id. at 711.
73. See. e.g., Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 715 (1975).
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tive of First Amendment rights; and (3) 4demonstrate a compelling
7
and overriding interest in the information.

Most lower federal courts and many state courts have interpreted
Branzburg as creating a qualified first amendment privilege for
journalists and have adopted the Stewart test or a variation thereof in
75
applying that privilege.
Although confidential sources were the focus of Branzburg, some
of the cases resolved in that opinion involved grand jury attempts to
gain access to unpublished material, such as reporter's notes or "outtakes," a term generally used to refer to parts of film or videotape that
were not broadcast.7 ' As Professor Franklin has observed, this information is sought for two disparate reasons. First, outtakes may provide
others with evidence of what occurred at a particular event; for example, a prosecutor who wants to file charges against persons who disrupted an otherwise peaceful protest march might subpoena all film
shot by a local television camera crew, including the portions not used
in a newscast. Second, outtakes or reporter's notes could reveal what
was not included in the final news story, thereby helping demonstrate
that the story was slanted or recklessly false because of the omissions.
Such material could prove useful to a defamation plaintiff seeking to
show that a news story or broadcast was distorted.7
The Supreme Court was faced with the latter situation in Herbert
74. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d
70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Bruno
& Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F&F Investment Co., 470 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394
(D.D.C. 1973); Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573,
581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847
(Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254
(1974). Some state courts, however, have read Branzburg quite narrowly, interpreting it as wholly
rejecting any sort of first amendment privilege. See, e.g., Pankratz v. District Ct., 609 P.2d 1101
(Colo. 1980); Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
930 (1977); In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
76. See supra note 68.
77. M. FRANKLIN. supra note 2, at 572.
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v. Lando,78 a 1979 decision that caused considerable furor among the
news media. 79 In that case, the plaintiff, a retired army officer and an
admitted public figure, sued CBS and a "60 Minutes" producer and
reporter for allegedly defamatory remarks aired on a segment about
the Vietnam War. During a deposition, the producer refused to answer
questions about why he had made certain investigations and not others,
what he thought about the honesty and credibility of persons he had
interviewed for the program, and what he had discussed with the reporter in preparing the program. The producer contended that these
"thought processes" and internal editorial decisions were protected
from disclosure by the first amendment, but the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the producer had no constitutional grounds for refusing to answer the questions.8 "
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice White conceded that the editorial process is entitled to some first amendment protection and asserted
that it could not be subjected to "private or official examination merely
to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest."8 1 However, no constitutional barrier exists to probing that process when there is a "specific claim of injury arising from a publication
that is alleged to have been knowingly or recklessly false.", 2 To hold
otherwise, Justice White concluded, would "erect an impenetrable barrier" to a libel plaintiff's use of the direct evidence most relevant in
establishing the requisite fault on the part of the defendant. 8
It seems clear that the Lando decision has no bearing on the confidential source issue, for the privilege for confidential source and that
asserted in Lando for editorial and thought processes are not analogous. 8 4 Most courts have not read Lando as affecting the qualified privilege established in Branzburg and have continued to apply the Stewart
78. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
79. See Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1049-58 (1979).
80. 441 U.S. at 175.
81. Id. at 174.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 170.
84. As the Fifth Circuit has observed:
In [Lando] the Supreme Court reasoned that requiring disclosure of journalists'
thought processes would have no chilling effect on the editorial process; the only effect
would be to deter recklessness. However, forced disclosure of journalists' sources might
deter informants from giving their stories to newsmen. .. "
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725, modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Moreover, while the sort of information sought in Lando will
always be material to a libel plaintiff's case, the identities of confidential sources will frequently be
irrelevant. Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits after Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 338,
359-60 (1981).
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test in apply that privilege.8 5 The impact of Lando on attempts to obtain non-published information is a bit more clouded, however. As
noted previously, a libel plaintiff may desire to review unpublished material in hopes that omitted information would suggest fault on the part
of the defendant news organization. These outtakes are plainly part of
the editorial process, and their disclosure could reveal to a defamation
plaintiff much the same information as an inquiry of the sort in Lando
calling for the journalist's "intentions manifested by his decision to in' 86
clude or exclude certain material.
Judge Franklin Waters took this approach in Williams v. American BroadcastingCompanies, 7 a case which also raised issues with respect to the Arkansas shield statute and which is discussed in more
detail below. Relying on Lando, Judge Waters squarely rejected the
defendants' claim of a privilege from disclosure of its "editorial decisions on which information to publish, regardless of whether the information is derived from confidential or nonconfidential sources."8 8 He
concluded that outtakes would be "highly probative and in many cases
the only proof of selective editing," which would be crucial to a plaintiff's action for libel or false-light invasion of privacy.8 9 Because the
disclosure sought by plaintiffs could not be described as "a matter of
mere satisfaction of curiosity," he held that no privilege existed under
Lando.90
Of course, Judge Waters could easily have reached the same result
in Williams had he employed the Stewart test or "heart of the claim"
analysis. Most courts have continued to use that approach after Lando
in cases involving outtakes or other non-published information, 9 1 as
85. See, e.:g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, modified.'628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); Mize v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475 (S.D. Tex. 1979). But see Rancho La Costa,
Inc. v. Penthouse International Ltd., 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1249 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980); Sierra Life
Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103 (1980).
86. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 n.2 (1979) (quoting lower court's summary of question posed to CBS producer).
87. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
88. Id. at 669.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 72
(1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1056
(1981); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Maughan v. NL Indus.,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 93 (D.D.C. 1981); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981). None of these decisions involved libel suits,
however.
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well as in cases in which confidential sources are implicated.9 2 As one
court has observed:
The right of a newspaper to determine for itself what it is to publish
and how it is to fulfill its mandate of dissemination must be given
great respect. .

.

. To compel the production of a reporter's . . .

notes can no doubt constitute a significant intrusion into and, certainly, a chilling effect upon the newsgathering and editorial
processes. .

.

. [C]ompelled production of [materials developed in

preparation of a news article] "is equally as invidious
as the com93
pelled disclosure of . . . confidential informants.
Moreover, it is important to note that Lando was uniquely based upon
the constitutionalized law of defamation, and its effect-if any-upon
Branzburg should be limited to the libel area. 94
At least two other developments should be noted. First, in
Branzburg itself Justice White issued a clear invitation to the states to
adopt shield statutes protecting confidential sources,95 and seven states
have responded since that decision.9" Second, while the Congress has
not enacted a federal shield statute, 97 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that in non-diversity cases, privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
92. See supra note 85.
93. Maughan v. NL Indus., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D.D.C. 1981).
94. Libel cases plainly involve considerations different from those raised in other situations in
which a reporter is asked to reveal confidential sources or other information. When the journalist
(or his employer) is a defendant, as in libel litigation, successful assertion of the reporter's privilege could effectively shield him from liability. On the other hand, when the journalist is not a
party to the proceeding, the equities that favor disclosure in the defamation context are not present. Thus, when a nonparty journalist-a "stranger"-is the target of a subpoena in a civil proceeding, the first amendment balance shifts more strongly in favor of nondisclosure, and a more
compelling showing is necessary to force revelation of confidential sources or other material.
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778,
783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Consumers Union, 495
F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Clampitt v. Thurston Co., 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641,
644-45 (1983). But see In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying same standard for
overcoming qualified privilege in libel litigation and in case where journalist is not a party).
95. 408 U.S. at 706.
96. Those states are: Delaware (1973), Minnesota (1973), Nebraska (1973), North Dakota
(1973), Oklahoma (1974), Oregon (1973), and Tennessee (1973). Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 304-08 (1979).
97. Ninety-nine bills establishing federal protection were introduced in the Congress between
1973 and 1978, but none passed. Comment, supra note 96, at 310. Nearly half a century earlier,
similar legislation was proposed in Congress after two District of Columbia reporters served jail
terms rather than reveal the names of some local bootleggers about whom they had written. The
bill failed. Steigleman, supra note 16, at 234.
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by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 98 Some federal courts have under this rule fashioned a journalist's privilege as a matter of federal common law.99
II.

EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE

In February 1976, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 100 which became effective on July 1 of that
year. The section on privileges includes a variety of specific privileges-such as lawyer-client, 10 physician-patient, 0 and husbandwife' 03-and states various general rules with respect to application of
the privileges. 0 4 Moreover, Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by constitution or statute or by these or
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of this State, no person has a privilege to:
(1) refuse to be a witness;
(2) refuse to disclose any matter;
(3) refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing. 10
What effect, if any, does this provision have upon the Arkansas shield
law?
It is clear that the Uniform Rules of Evidence did not expressly
repeal section 43-917 of Arkansas Statutes Annotated. Section 2 of Act
No. 1143-the act adopting the rules-specifically repealed a variety
98. FED. R. EvID. 501. As initially promulgated by the Supreme Court, the rules contained
thirteen separate provisions on privilege, and the ensuing furor was primarily responsible for delaying the effective date of the rules for two years as Congress studied the matter. The major
objections with the Supreme Court's draft included: the short shrift given state law, the implied
"usurpation" of Congress' role by the Supreme Court, the handling of some of the traditional
privileges, and the provisions respecting governmental privilege. P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 199 n.5 (Supp. 1975). The Supreme Court's version did
not include a privilege for journalists. Id.
99. See. e.g.. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Senear v.
Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982) (adopting privilege as matter of
state common law). See generally Comment, Riley v. City of Chester and United States v.
Cuthbertson: An Emerging Federal Common-Law Privilegefor Confidential Sources, 60 N.C.L.
REV. 656 (1982).
100. 1975 ARK. AcTs 1143, at 2799 (extended sess. 1976) (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §
28-1001 (1979)).
101. ARK.STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, ARK. R. EvID. 502 (1979).
102. Id., ARK. R. EvID. 503.
103. Id., ARK. R. EvID. 504.
104. Id., ARK. R. EVID. 510-12.
105. Id., ARK. R. EviD. 501.
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of statutes but did not list the shield law among them. 06 However,
section 2 also repealed "[a]ll other laws and parts of laws in conflict
with this Act,"' 10 7 and it could be argued that the legislature, in enacting the Uniform Rules of Evidence, intended to repeal section 43-917.
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
question, this argument is untenable in light of the plain language of
Rule 501 as well as the case law touching on the issue. 108
That the legislature did not intend the rules of evidence to be the
sole source for testimonial privileges is made plain by the exception in
Rule 501 for privileges "provided by constitution or statute or by these
or other rules. . . ." The effect of this language is to incorporate into
the rules of evidence various privileges not found within the rules themselves."0 ' Because the journalist's privilege is embodied in a statute, it
falls within the exception and remains effective. Judge Waters reached
this result in Williams v. American BroadcastingCompanies,"' a federal diversity case applying Arkansas law. As Judge Waters observed,
"Rule 501 clearly negates the existence of any privilege not granted by
the Arkansas Constitution or by statute or Supreme Court rule.""'
However, he also noted that while the rules of evidence do not mention
a newsman's privilege, section 43-917 is the "statutory authority for
such a privilege.""'
The Williams decision is consistent with the analogous case of
Winston v. Robinson," 3 in which the supreme court considered the impact of the rules of evidence upon a provision in the bastardy statutes
that allowed the introduction into evidence of blood tests only to estab106. 1975 ARK. ACTS 1143, § 2(A), at 2847-48 (extended sess. 1976).
107. Id. at 2(b).
108. The fact that the shield statute was part of an initiated act does not affect the repeal
argument, for the rules of evidence were adopted without dissenting vote by both houses of the
legislature: 31-0 in the Senate, 85-0 in the House. 1975 ARK. LEGIs. DIG., 70th Gen. Assembly,
H-N-40 (extended sess. 1976). Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution requires a two-thirds
vote of each house in the legislature for the amendment or repeal of any measure "approved by a
" ARK. CONST. amend. 7. Thus, the vote on the rules of evidence would be
vote of the people ..
sufficient to repeal section 43-917. See Townsend v. City of Helena, 244 Ark. 228, 232 n. 7, 424
S.W.2d 856, 859 n.7 (portion of 1936 initiated act regarding insanity defense had been repealed
by 1949 statute), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 917 (1968).
109. See Field, A Code of Evidence for Arkansas? 29 ARK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1975).
110. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
Ill. Id. at 662. Rule 501 also seems to provide for privileges recognized under the federal
constitution.
112. Id. In Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978), the
supreme court applied the shield statute in an opinion handed down more than two years after the
rules of evidence became effective but did not discuss the relationship between the rules and the
statute or consider an implied repeal argument.
113. 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980).
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lish nonpaternity. 1" Despite this statute, the trial court had allowed
into evidence two blood tests, which did not exclude the defendant as
the father, for purposes of establishing paternity. On appeal, the plaintiff-appellee defended the trial court's action, arguing that the statute
had been repealed by the general repealer clause in the act adopting
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The court, in an opinion by Special
Justice George Pike, Jr., rejected the argument.
Justice Pike made two key points, both of which are applicable
with respect to section 43-917. First, he noted that the rules of evidence
expressly repealed one provision of the bastardy statutes but left untouched the blood test provision at issue in Winston." 5 Similarly, the
rules of evidence specifically repealed two statutes relating to privilege
that appeared in the same title of the statutes as the journalist's privilege provision."" Second, he observed that Rule 402 of the rules of
evidence-the general admissibility provision-"acknowledges that
other statutes may render inadmissible evidence that otherwise would
be admissible under the rules." ' 17 Even with the enactment of the rules
of evidence, Justice Pike wrote, "the General Assembly still may have
enacted or may later enact specific statutes dealing with the admissibility of evidence. 11 8 Accordingly, he concluded that there is no conflict
between Rule 402 and the blood test statute and that the former did
not repeal the latter. Precisely the same analysis should govern the interpretation of Rule 501 and section 43-917.
The fact that the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence were enacted by the General Assembly rather than promulgated by the Supreme Court avoids, at least for the moment, a problem that has arisen
in other jurisdictions with respect to the separation of powers doctrine.119 In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,120 the New
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-705.1 (Repl. 1962). The statute has since been amended. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-705.1 (Supp. 1983).
115. 270 Ark. at 1001, 606 S.W.2d at 760.
116. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2019, 43-2020 (Repl. 1964) (testimony of one spouse in behalf
of or against the other). For the present law, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, ARK. R. EVID.
(1977).
117. 270 Ark. at 1002, 606 S.W.2d at 761. Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll
relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules.
ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, ARK. R. EVID. 402 (1977).
118. 270 Ark. at 1002, 606 S.W.2d at 761. He added that such statutes "legitimately express
the public policy of the State on the admissibility of evidence, for example, that may be of dubious
reliability." Id.
119. The Arkansas Constitution contains explicit separation of powers language, providing
for "three distinct departments," none of which "shall exercise any power belonging to . . .the
others." ARK. CONST. art IV, §§ I & 2. As the supreme court has observed, "[nleither of the
three separate departments of government is subordinate to the other and neither can arrogate to
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Mexico Supreme Court held unconstitutional the state's shield statute,
at least insofar as it applied to judicial proceedings, on the ground that
it conflicted with the court's inherent authority to prescribe rules of
procedure.' 2 1 Concluding that privileges are part and parcel of the rules
of evidence and that the latter are procedural in nature, the court held
that "under our Constitution the Legislature lacks power to prescribe
by statute rules of evidence and procedure, this constitutional power

[being] vested exclusively in this court.

....

"22

The court, which had

adopted the uniform rules of evidence in 1973, determined that the
shield statute impermissibly expanded the privileges recognized in the
New Mexico version of Rule 501.123
While Arkansas case law on the nature of inherent judicial power
is scant, a handful of illustrative decisions can be found. For example,
the supreme court has held that the legislature cannot regulate how the
1 25

court writes its opinions,'" force a trial court to grant a continuance,

or impair the judicial power to punish for contempt.1 2 6 It also seems
clear that the court has inherent authority to supervise the state's
2 7
judges, including the power to adopt a code of judicial conduct.1
itself any control over either one of the others in matters which have been confided by the constitution to such other department." Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 462, 592 S.W.2d 100, 104
(1979). For a discussion of the doctrine with respect to the division between the executive and
legislative branches, see Powers, Separation of Powers-The Unconstitutionalityof the Arkansas
Legislative Council, 36 ARK. L. REV. 124 (1982). See also Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Separation
of Powers-Legislative Delegation of Judicial Powers, 10 ARK. L. REV. 213 (1956).
120. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), noted in 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 493.
121. Id., 551 P.2d at 1359. The issue was noted but not resolved in Grand Forks Herald v.
Grand Forks County Dist. Ct., 322 N.W.2d 850, 853 n.3 (N.D. 1982), and People v. Zagarino, 97
Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
122. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d at 1359.
123. Id., 551 P.2d at 1358-59. Rule 501 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence provides in
pertinent part that "[e]xcept as otherwise required by constitution, and except as provided in these
rules or in other rules adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to ...." In
contrast, Arkansas Rule 501 excepts other statutes as well. See supra text accompanying note
105.
124. Upton v. State, 255 Ark. 1071, 502 S.W.2d 454 (1973); Vaughn v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160,
4 S.W. 751 (1887).
125. McConnell v. State, 227 Ark. 988, 302 S.W.2d 805 (1957).
126. Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S.W. 860 (1922); State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384
(1855). See also Federal Express Corp. v. Skelton, 265 Ark. 187, 578 S.W.2d 1 (1979) (legislature cannot retroactively annul a statute that has been construed by supreme court, thereby abrogating judicial pronouncement in a given case); Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark.
213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984) (noting that exception in state freedom of information act exempting
from disclosure any documents protected by order or rule of court "prevents any entanglement in
the separation of powers doctrine").
127. Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 35 ARK. L. REV. 247, 248 (1981). See
State ex rel. Lynch v. Dancey, 71 Wis. 2d 287, 238 N.W.2d 81 (1976) (supreme court has inherent power to adopt code of judicial ethics, and that code pre-empts state open meetings law with
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While earlier decisions seem to concede the legislature's power to control procedure in "any and all" of the state's courts,' 28 more recent
cases suggest that the supreme court may promulgate rules of practice
and procedure even absent an enabling statute.
For example, in 1975 the supreme court adopted rules of criminal
procedure for the state "[p]ursuant to Act 470 of 1971, and in harmony with the Court's constitutional superintending control over all
trial courts ..
"I Two years later, in Miller v. State,'"0 the court
rejected the argument that the rules were invalid because Act 470 had
impermissibly delegated legislative powers to the judiciary. Writing for
the majority, Justice Frank Holt explained that the court, in adopting
the rules of criminal procedure, "implicitly rejected the argument advanced here that we had no inherent rule making authority absent an
enabling statute."' 13 Because Act 470 "merely recognizes and is harmonious with this court's inherent powers," ' 2 the court concluded that
there had been no unconstitutional delegation of power to the judicial
branch. The court again made the point in Jennings v. State, 33 observing that "if we have the inherent power to make the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, it follows that we have the inherent power to amend those
rules.' 3 4 The court also cited its "constitutional and inherent power to
regulate procedure in the courts" as well as enabling legislation in
3
promulgating the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.1 5
respect to meetings of state judicial commission).
128. White v. Arkansas & Missouri Hwy. Dist., 147 Ark. 160, 227 S.W. 261 (1921). Accord
Titan Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Shipley, 257 Ark. 278, 517 S.W.2d 210 (1974); Wilson v. Lucas, 185
Ark. 183, 47 S.W.2d 8 (1932); Ex parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923); Fisher v.
Hall, I Ark. 275 (1839). The debate as to whether courts have inherent authority to adopt procedural rules has surfaced in several states and has spawned considerable commentary. See, e.g.,
Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts to Make Rules, 10 U. CINN. L. REV. 32 (1936); Kaplan
& Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rulemaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Wigmore, All
Legislative Rules for Judicicary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276
(1928).
129. In re Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Comm'n, 259 Ark. 863, 864, 530 S.W.2d 672,
673 (1975).
130. 262 Ark. 223, 555 S.W.2d 563 (1977).
131. Id. at 226, 555 S.W.2d at 564.
132. Id.
133. 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
134. Id. at 218, 633 S.W.2d at 374.
135. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 264 Ark. 964 (1978). See 1973 ARK. ACTS 38, at 89-90
(enabling legislation). Since adoption of the rules of civil procedure, the legislature has enacted
one statute overriding a particular rule. In 1981 the General Assembly reenacted a provision that
had been superseded by the rules of civil procedure, providing for the powers of masters
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Whether the Arkansas Supreme Court possesses the inherent authority to promulgate rules of evidence is therefore an open question, as
is the impact of such power upon the statutory newsman's privilege.
Interestingly, Rule 501 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence seems to
invite the court to adopt its own rules as to privileges, though the rule
recognizes that statutes can also create such privileges. Rule 501 states
as a general matter that no one has a privilege to refuse to be a witness
or to produce documentary material, but notes an exception for other
statutes and "these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
of this State. .... ,1 It would be possible, of course, for the court to
hold that the legislative and judicial branches share the power to promulgate evidentiary rules,"3 7 but this resolution of the problem would
suffice only if the court adopted a rule that did not conflict with section
43-917 or another statutory privilege. A direct conflict, as in the Ammerman case, would force the court to determine which branch holds
the paramount power.
Faced with that question, the Arkansas Supreme Court should reject Ammerman, which is based on a faulty premise: that testimonial
privileges are procedural in nature. Unlike evidentiary rules which govern the reliability and relevance of information presented to the courts,
testimonial privileges are enacted to serve social policies wholly unrelated to the needs of the adversarial system of justice. Instead, they are
created to foster relationships which society believes worthy of protection, although that protection may interfere with the search for truth in
judicial proceedings.13 8 For example, the journalist's privilege is
grounded in the notion that the free flow of information to the public is
"[n]otwithstanding the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, and specifically Rule 53.
... ARK.
§ 27-1801 (Supp. 1983).
136. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, ARK. R. EvID. 501 (1977). Oddly enough, this apparent
dual authority is probably the result of a drafting error, for it seems unlikely that the General
Assembly intended to delegate to the supreme court the power to reshape the rule of privilege that
had been legislatively adopted. Rule 501 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws recognizes an exception for statutes or
"these or other rules promulgated by the [Supreme Court of this State].
... UNIF. R. EVID.
501; 13 U.L.A. 248 (1980). The bracketed language would be appropriate only if the state supreme court had itself adopted the rules of evidence; otherwise, it seems that the name of the
authority that promulgated the rules-in Arkansas, the legislature-should appear in that space.
137. See Jackson v. Ozment, 283 Ark. 100, 101, 671 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1984) (art. VII, §§ I
& 4 of state constitution, which place in supreme court superintending control over all inferior
courts, "do not expressly or by implication confer on this Court exclusive authority to set rules of
court procedure").
138. Note, A Study in Governmental Separation of Powers: Judicial Response to State
Shield Laws, 66 GEO. L.J. 1273, 1283 (1978). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2175, 2196 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed. 1972).
STAT. ANN.
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enhanced by confidential relationships between reporters and their
sources. 13 9 In deciding that confidential sources should be protected,
the General Assembly obviously decided that ensuring an unimpeded
flow of news to the public is generally more important than the "search
for truth" in a given case. Such an accommodation of competing societal interests is the hallmark of substantive law, 140 and the duty to balance those interests rest with the legislature.""'
The separation of powers doctrine, however, creates an additional
problem with respect to shield statutes, which arguably impair the ability of the courts to perform their constitutionally mandated functions.
This question arose in a 1971 California case, Farr v. Superior
Court," 2 which stemmed from a reporter's refusal to disclose his
sources for a statement released in violation of a judicial "gag order"
imposed during the highly publicized murder trial of Charles Manson.
The reporter admitted that his sources were two attorneys and another
person subject to the gag order but, pointing to the California shield
statute, refused to name them. Affirming the trial judge's contempt order, the appellate court held that the shield law impermissibily interfered with the trial court's ability to enforce an order designed to ensure a fair trial for the defendants. Accordingly, the shield law was
deemed an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial power and
held invalid under the separation of powers doctrine." 43
The Farrcase should not be read as a broad condemnation of all
statutes creating testimonial privileges. First, it is safe to say as a general matter that the application of testimonial privileges does not significantly interfere with the exercise of judicial power, although it obviously affects a court's ability to acquire information bearing on a given
case." Second, Farr involved a shield statute that not only protected
139. Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So.2d 1206, 1208 (La. App.
1976); State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803, 808 (1981). See generally C.
WHALEN, supra note 1, at 125-46; Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REv. 829, 857-65 (1974).
140. Note, supra note 138, at 1284-85. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974) (granting or withholding evidentiary privilege requires balancing of competing interests).
,141.
Note, supra note 120, at 503-04. See also Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine, 2 COM. AND THE LAW I, 8 (Fall 1980). As noted previously, the privileges
contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court spawned a major
controversy in the Congress and led to legislative enactment of different privilege provisions. See
supra note 98. One reason for the dispute was congressional sentiment that the Court's privilege
rules intruded into the legislative sphere because of their "social policy" implications. Comment,
Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1059, 1060 (1975).
142. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
143. Id. at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
144. Note, supra note 138, at 1288. In contrast to privilege statutes stand laws that restrict
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confidential sources but also eliminated the court's power to hold in
contempt a reporter who refused to reveal his sources. " " It has been
widely held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent with the
judiciary.' 4 6 Finally, the California shield statute was absolute in its
protection for confidential sources, and a statute providing only a qualified privilege would avoid the separation of powers problem by leaving
to the courts the ultimate decision to compel disclosure. " , The Arkansas statute, while not entirely clear in terms of when disclosure may be
required, creates only a qualified privilege " 8 and does not purport to
affect the contempt power of the courts. Accordingly, the problem present in Farr should not arise in Arkansas.
III.

THE ACT IN OPERATION

In its forty-eight year history, the Arkansas shield statute has been
interpreted and applied in only two reported cases, both arising in the
past six years. An unreported 1967 case and an attorney general's opinion also shed some light on the act, but as a practical matter one faced
with a problem involving the newsman's privilege in Arkansas is walking uncharted ground. This portion of the article examines typical
questions raised in shield law cases and resolution of those issues under
section 43-917 of Arkansas Statutes Annotated.
At the outset, however, it should be noted that shield legislation
has had a rather hostile reception in the courts of some states, which
have construed some statutes quite narrowly. Noting that the common
law afforded no such privilege for journalists, these courts have held
judicial control over court operations, attempt to direct what are essentially judicial decisions, or
limit court independence. Id. See, e.g., Houstin v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859)(law requiring court
to issue opinion in every case); State ex. rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150
So. 508 (1933) (law interfering with court's mandamus power); Board of County Comm'rs v.
General Sec. Corp., 157 Kan. 64, 138 P.2d 479 (1943) (directing court in the interpretation of an
existing law). The Arkansas cases cited supra notes 124-26 also seem to fall into these categories.
145. At the time of the Farr case, the California statute provided:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a
court, the Legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source of
any information procured for publication and published in a newspaper.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966). The statute has been frequently amended since the Farr
decision, and in 1980 the voters approved a constitutional amendment prohibiting the courts from
holding in contempt reporters who refuse to reveal confidential sources. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
146. See, e.g., Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S.W. 860 (1922); State v. Morrill, 16 Ark.
384 (1855); In re San Francisco Chronicle, I Cal. 2d 630, 36 P.2d 369 (1934). See generally
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971).
147. Note, supra note 138, at 1290. See also Day, supra note 141, at 15.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 223-48.
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that shield statutes are to be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law. 14 9 In contrast, courts in other jurisdictions
have held that the statutes must be liberally construed because of the
public policy they reflect. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, adopted a rule of liberal construction because "independent newspapers are today the principal watch-dogs and protectors of honest, as
well as good, Government."' 50
Although it has often applied the rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed,""1 the Arkansas Supreme Court has suggested that section 43-917 is to be liberally interpreted. In its only decision involving the statute, Saxton v. Arkansas
Gazette Co.,' 52 the court held that the act applies in civil as well as
criminal proceedings, despite its history as part of a criminal law reform package and its location in the criminal procedure title of the
Arkansas Statutes. 53 A narrow reading of the act could obviously have
led the court to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, in Williams v.
American Broadcasting Companies,""a federal diversity case, Judge
Waters held that the act applies to television journalists although it
specifically mentions only newspapers, periodicals, and radio stations.1 5 5
In the same case, however, the court cited the rule of strict construction and held that the statute protects only sources of information, not
outtakes or unpublished material. 5
In construing the shield statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court
should adopt the rule of liberal interpretation, as it has done in cases
under the state's freedom of information act (FOIA). 157 In the first
149. See, e.g., In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lightman v. State, 15
Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, 157, opinion adopted, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 486, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (1943).
See also Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (construing shield statute narrowly even though rule that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed does not apply in Kentucky), aff'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
150. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 42, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963). Accord Rosato v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 217, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 445 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976).
151. See, e.g.., Grimmett v. State, 251 Ark. 270, 273, 476 S.W.2d 217, 221 (1972); Starkey
Constr., Inc. v. Elcon, Inc., 248 Ark. 958, 965, 457 S.W.2d 509, 513 (1970); Wright v. Wright,
248 Ark. 105, 108, 449 S.W.2d 952, 953 (1970); Gill v. State, 242 Ark. 797, 801, 416 S.W.2d
269, 271 (1967).
152. 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
153. Id. at 136, 569 S.W.2d at 117.
154. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
155. Id. at 665.
156. Id.
157. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2801-12-2807 (1979 & Supp. 1983). See generally Watkins,
Access to Public Records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 37 ARK. L. REV. 741
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FOIA case, Laman v. McCord,158 the court rejected the argument that
the statute was a penal provision that must be strictly construed. Justice George Rose Smith wrote for the court that the freedom of information act "was passed wholly in the public interest and is to be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be
achieved." 1 59 Like the FOIA, the shield statute was enacted to help
ensure that the citizens of Arkansas receive a free flow of information
about public issues,160 and the reasoning of the court in Laman applies
with equal force to section 43-917.
A.

Persons Covered by the Statute

In a 1964 defamation case, a federal district court held that the
California shield statute, which applied to persons "connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, '' 6 could not be invoked by a magazine journalist. 6 ' The court
stressed that the statute used the term "newspaper" rather than "periodical" and concluded that the legislature intended to distinguish between the two types of publications.' 6 3 Similarly, another federal court
held that the Ohio statute, which provided protection for journalists
employed by "any newspaper or any press association," 164 did not extend to the publisher of a bi-monthly business report. 6 5
(1984).
158. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
159. Id. at 404-05, 432 S.W.2d at 755. Accord Baxter County Newspapers, Inc. v. Medical
Staff of Baxter Gen. Hosp., 273 Ark. 511, 514, 622 S.W.2d 495, 496 (1981); Arkansas State
Police Comm'n v. Davidson, 253 Ark. 1090, 1094, 490 S.W.2d 788, 791 (1973).
160. As a Louisiana court has observed:
The obvious statutory intent is to encourage the divulgence of news by informants who
might otherwise hesitate to disclose matters of public import for fear of unfavorable
publicity or the possibility of retribution resulting from their being revealed as the
source of a particular news item. In so providing, our statute supports the basic right of
the public to be informed by permitting a newspaper reporter to maintain the confidentiality of his news sources.
Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil. Serv. Bd., 341 So.2d 1206, 1208 (La. App. 1976).
See also State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App.3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803, 808 (1981).
161. CAL. CIv. P. CODE § 1881(6) (Supp. 1963). The statute, which also applied to radio and
television journalists, has since been amended to include reporters for magazines and other periodicals. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (Supp. 1984).
162. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
163. Id. at 473. The court also pointed out that the statute, which originally applied only to
newspaper reporters, had been amended to include journalists working for press associations, wire
services, and radio and television stations. Id.
164. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1981). This provision has not been changed
since its enactment in 1953.
165. Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788, 789-90 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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The Arkansas statute avoids some - but not all - definitional
problems of this sort. Section 43-917 expressly provides a privilege for
any publisher, editor, reporter or other writer for a newspaper or periodical and the owner, manager, editor, reporter or other writer for a
radio station.16 6 Accordingly, the magazine writer and newsletter publisher in the two cases discussed above would be protected by the Arkansas act, since both undoubtedly were connected with a "periodical."
Use of the term "periodical" also makes plain that the act is not limited to newspapers that meet requirements set out in other statutes with
respect to circulation or frequency of publication.16 7 Even if a newspaper does not fall within such a definition, it is nevertheless a "periodical" within the meaning of the statute.
As noted previously, Judge Waters held in Williams v. American
Broadcasting Companies'68 that section 43-917 applies to television
journalists, 69 although the statute itself does not mention the medium.
Given the role of television today in the dissemination of news, that
construction of the statute is eminently reasonable. If the journalist's
privilege is worthy of protection, it should be extended to persons who
work for all forms of media, including wire services, press associations,
newspaper syndicates, and cable television operations."' For the same
reason, the statute should also be interpreted to include photographers
and television cameramen.17 1 The statute is apparently broad enough to
cover freelance journalists as well, for it applies to "other writer[s]" for
newspapers or radio stations as well as to reporters and editors. In addition, the act is not on its face limited to persons regularly employed
by news organizations." 7 Because the statute was clearly aimed at
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977).
167. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 15-108 (1979) (defining "legal newspaper" for purpose of statutes requiring publication of legal notices).
168. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
169. Id. at 665.
170. Some state shield statutes contain "laundry lists" of news media whose reporters enjoy
the privilege. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(l) (1983) (newspaper, magazine, press
association, news service, radio station, television station, cable television system); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(2) (West 1980) (newspaper, magazine, other periodicals, book, pamphlet,
news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, cable television
system).
171. The Rhode Island statute, for example, covers reporters, editors, commentators, journalists, writers, correspondents, news photographers or other persons "directly engaged in the gathering or presentation of news ..
" R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1983).
172. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (first amendment privilege applies to freelance documentary filmmaker). Compare N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §
79-h(6) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (defining journalist for purposes of shield statute as "regular
employee" of news media or person "otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood" with

166.
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journalists, however, it would probably not be construed to include historians, researchers, educators or others who disseminate information
as opposed to "news.' ' 3
It seems clear that journalists are entitled to the statutory privilege
only to the extent that they receive information from confidential
sources within the course of their newsgathering activities. That is, confidential sources who provide material to the reporter in some capacity
other than his role as a journalist would be subject to disclosure. Although the Arkansas statute does not expressly so provide, such a requirement can be implied from the language limiting the privilege to
"the source of information used as the basis for any article he may
have written, published or broadcast. ....
The "scope of employment" limitation is a reasonable one, for the purpose of the statute-to
encourage informants to confide in journalists-is not served when the
privilege is applied to communications received outside the course of
employment.17 5 By the same token, however, the statute should be construed to cover former journalists who, during their tenure as members
of the working press, were supplied information by confidential
sources. 1 6 The privilege is of little value in encouraging the flow of
media organization); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980) (covering person "independently engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast") with IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Burns Supp. 1984) (limiting privilege to "bona fide . . .employee").
173. See People v. LeGrand 67 A.D.2d 446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 255 (1979) (shield statute
held inapplicable to author of book). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 10 MED. L. RPTR. 2065
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (extending first amendment privilege to scholar).
174. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977). Some state statutes contain express "scope of employment" provisions. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4321 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5I (Burns Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, § 1452 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2506(B) (West 1980).
175. D'Alemberte, supra note 10, at 336. Cf.Shindler v. State, 335 N.E.2d 638, 644-46
(Ind. App. 1975) (rejecting argument that investigative reporter was acting as agent of law enforcement agency and thus not entitled to invoke privilege). Some courts have interpreted "scope
of employment" provisions too rigidly, however. For example, in In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d
335, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Cty. Ct. 1971), afl'd, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1973), a radio
station received an anonymous telephone call advising that a bomb had been planted. The caller
added that a letter containing more details had been placed in a nearby phone booth. A newscaster picked up the letter, called the police, and read the letter over the air. The court held that
the state shield statute did not protect the letter because the radio station did not obtain it in the
course of newsgathering activities. The mere "passive" receipt of unsolicited information did not,
in the court's view, constitute newsgathering. 68 Misc. 2d 335, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The New
York legislature subsequently amended the statute to include unsolicited as well as solicited material. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (privilege applies "notwithstanding that the information was not solicited by the journalist or newscaster prior to disclosure to him"); People v. lannacone, 112 Misc.2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (Sup. Ct. 1982)
(discussing the amendment).
176. Several state statutes are expressly applicable to former journalists. See, e.g., CAL.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:473

information from source to reporter if it vanishes for purposes of past
communications when the journalist enters a new line of work.
It should also be noted at this point that section 43-917 grants a
privilege to the journalist, not to his confidential source. Courts in other
jurisdictions have uniformly held that such a statutory privilege may be
invoked only by the journalists. 177 For example, in a 1970 decision, the
Indiana Supreme Court rejected a criminal defendant's contention that
the trial court had erred in allowing a newspaper reporter to testify,
over the defendant's objection, to a conversation with the reporter while
the defendant was in jail awaiting trial. 178 The court held that the Indiana shield statute created a right personal to the reporter, a right that
only he could invoke. Since the journalist was willing to testify at trial,
1 79
there was no problem under the shield statute.
B.

Nature of the Privilege

State shield statutes vary widely with respect to the type of material they protect from disclosure. For example, some statutes protect
only the identity of a source of information, 8 0 while others also reach
reporter's notes, outtakes, and unpublished information-that is, virtually any information acquired during the course of the journalist's newsgathering activities.1 81 The Arkansas statute contains two important
limitations: (1) on its face, it applies only to sources of information,
and (2) it may be invoked only if the source has provided information
as the basis for a story that has been published or broadcast.
The only reported decision dealing with either of these limitations
is Williams v. American Broadcasting Companies,8 ' a federal diverEVID. CODE § 1070 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1984); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7-(b)(8) (Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §

44.530(2) (1983).
177. See, e.g., Hestand v. State, 257 Ind. 191, 273 N.E.2d 282 (1971); Lightman v. State, 15
Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, opinion adopted. 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 951 (1973); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J.L. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964).
178. Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E.2d 622 (1970).
179. Id., 258 N.E.2d at 626.
180. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1983); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Page 1981).
181.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-112 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-146
(1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980).
182. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
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sity case applying Arkansas law. 83 The case grew out of a report on
ABC's "20/20" news program implying that a Harrison doctor routinely performed unnecessary surgery and was generally incompetent to
practice medicine. In addition, the report included film of hip surgery
performed on a Boone County woman. The patient brought suit against
ABC alleging that the operation had been filmed without her knowledge or consent and its broadcast had invaded her privacy. The physician brought a defamation action against the network and also claimed
that an "ambush" interview with him that was aired on the broadcast
placed him in a "false light" before the public. During discovery, the
plaintiffs sought an order compelling ABC to produce the outtakes of
all film or video tape produced in connection with the broadcast. 184
Judge Waters granted the motions to compel, rejecting first
amendment and statutory arguments raised by ABC. With respect to
section 43-917, the network had contended that the outtakes were protected from disclosure by the statute. The court, however, refused to
bring such unpublished information within the ambit of the shield law,
pointing to the statute's plain language and the general rule that statutes at variance with the common law are to be strictly construed. 8 5
Judge Waters wrote:
[T]he statute, by its own terms, applies only so as to protect "the
source." Further, the source is not protected in the event of bad faith
or malice on the part of the reporter. Plaintiffs do not seek any information as to sources. Defendants do not even assert that the out-takes
would lead to the discovery of a source. Plaintiffs have alleged, and
presumably stand prepared to attempt to prove bad faith or malice on
the part of defendants.
. . .[we] conclude that the Arkansas courts, if faced with the precise
"out-take" situation present here, would hold that section 43-917 does
183. The choice of law issue in the case is also an interesting one, and this problem frequently arises in shield law settings. In Williams, ABC contended that it should be protected by
the New York shield statute, since the network and its employees are citizens of that state, all
editorial decisions are made there, and all broadcasts originate there. Moreover, they argued that
it would be unfair to subject network reporters to the varying shield laws or absence of such
statutes in the fifty states. The court, however, concluded that the Arkansas courts would look to
Arkansas law under the general rule that the competency and admissibility of evidence are to be
determined by the law of the forum state. 96 F.R.D. at 662. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Long, 186 Ark. 320, 53 S.W.2d 433 (1932). Of course, a federal court in a diversity case must
apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
184. 96 F.R.D. at 660.
185. Id. at 664-65. For a discussion of the "strict
construction" aspect of this case, see supra
text accompanying notes 154-56.
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not protect out-takes in a libel or privilege case, which would not in
any respect reveal a source."' 6
Most courts have taken this approach in construing statutes which,
like section 43-917, mention only sources of information. 187 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has held that outtakes and other unpublished material are protected under that state's shield law, although
the statute provides express protection only for sources.1 88 Reasoning
that "[tihe common and approved meaning of the words 'source of information' includes documents as well as personal informants,"18 9 the
court held that the shield statute applied to a reporter's tape recordings, memoranda of interviews, and notes developed in connection with
a news story. A more conservative approach is to extend statutory protection for "sources" to unpublished material and background information only if disclosure of these items would tend to reveal the identity of
a source. 190 Although he did not decide the question in Williams, Judge
Waters intimated that he was willing to protect the ABC outtakes if
their disclosure would have revealed a source. 91
Because the Arkansas statute has for the moment been construed
to protect only the identities of those who furnish information to journalists, it is important to define exactly what is meant by "source" in
this context. One of the Kentucky cases that led to the United States
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Branzburg v. Hayes192 offers
perhaps the best illustration of the problem. In Branzburg v. Pound,'9 3
a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journalwas called by a grand
jury and questioned about his reporting of drug abuse in the area. He
refused to identify persons he had interviewed for a news story, which
186. 96 F.R.D. at 665.
187. E.g. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App. 1971), affid on other grounds, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So.2d 1206 (La.
App. 1976); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, opinion adopted, 266 Md. 550,
295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); Forest Hills Utility Co. v. City of Heath,
66 Ohio Op.2d 66, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P. 1973).
188. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
189. Id., 193 A.2d at 184-85. See also Lal v. CBS, Inc., 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984); Steaks
Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1980); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 693 (C.P. 1977).
190. Rosato v. Superior Court., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 445 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The California legislature ultimately amended the shield statute to include unpublished material such as notes and outtakes. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070
(West Supp. 1984); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
612 (1979).
191. 96 F.R.D. at 665. See supra text accompanying note 186.
192. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
193. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App. 1971), affid on other grounds,, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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made clear that he had observed two individuals synthesizing hashish
from marijuana. Although the state's shield statute protects the
"source of information," 9 4 the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded
that the "source" of this particular article was the reporter's own personal observation and that the identities of the two persons making the
drug were part of the "information" that the reporter had obtained. 95
Because the statute covered only the source and not the information
itself, the reporter was compelled to identify the persons he had observed producing the hashish.1 96
Although this view has been criticized as an exercise in "verbal
gymnastics, 197 it has prevdiled in other jurisdictions as well.' 98 There
is, of course, a contrary approach. As Chief Justice Hill pointed out in
his Branzburg dissent, nothin# in the statute excepts those situations in
which the reporter observes his "sources" committing a criminal act.' 99
The chief justice also noted that "the phrase 'source of any information' is a broad, comprehensive one, certainly not a technical
phrase." 2 00 He added: "[W]e have a situation requiring the balance of
values and I believe, as apparently did the Legislature, that the benefits
to society from thoroughly and correctly reporting current events
greater outweighs the probable and highly imaginary possibility of
their abuse under the statute." '' The gist of this position is that shield
statutes generally do not distinguish between (1) an informant who observes a crime and then "tips" a reporter, and (2) a reporter who, after
gaining the confidence of an individual, observes first-hand that person
committing a criminal offense. Since the legislatures have not drawn
such a distinction, the argument goes, the courts should refrain from
doing so. In either of the two situations, assertion of the privilege would
deprive law enforcement officials of access to the wrongdoers, and it
arguably matters little that the reporter learned of the violation via
194. Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972).
195. 461 S.W.2d at 347.
196. Id.
197. Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of News Sources, 61
Ky. L.J. 551, 558 (1973).
198. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, opinion
adopted, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); People v. Dan,
41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731, appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 764, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955, 298
N.E.2d 118 (1973).
199. 461 S.W.2d at 348.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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personal observation of second-hand information. 0 2 Given the weight
of authority to the contrary, however, it seems unlikely that the Arkansas courts would adopt Chief Justice Hill's approach.
It is reasonably clear, however, that the term "source" includes
virtually anyone who furnishes information to a news organization. Attorney General Steve Clark, for example, has suggested in an informal
opinion that the identity of the author of a "letter to the editor" can be
withheld under section 43-917,205 a result consistent with case law in
other jurisdictions. In a recent Louisiana case, Becnel v. Lucia,20 4 an
intermediate appellate court held that a letter writer is a "source of
information" within the state's shield statute, 0 5 reasoning that a letter
writer, like any other source, "might otherwise hesitate to disclose matters of public import for fear of unfavorable publicity or the possibility
of retribution resulting from [his] being revealed as the source of a
particular news item." 20 6 Similarly, a New York court concluded that a
letter to the editor qualifies as "news" for purposes of the state shield

law, which protects "news or the source of any such news. ....

*"207

The

court pointed out that the letter in question alleged that tavern owners
had contributed to the drunk driving problem by serving liquor to obviously intoxicated persons, a matter of obvious public interest and
20 8

concern.

Unlike some shield statutes,

09

section 43-917 does not limit the

202. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (finding no principled distinction between
situations in which reporter observes criminal conduct and those "where a source is not engaged in
criminal conduct but has information suggesting illegal conduct by others"); Tofani v. State, 297
Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413, 425 (1983) (same).
203. Informal Opinion to Wendel Sloan (May 7, 1979). The Attorney General is authorized
by statute to render formal opinions at the request of certain public officials, including members of
the General Assembly, all state boards and commissions, the heads of executive departments, and
prosecuting attorneys. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-702, 12-703 (1979). In the past few years, it has
also become common for the Attorney General to issue "informal" opinions to persons not authorized by law to request official opinions. These informal opinions do not bear an opinion number
and typically include language making plain that they are merely "an informal and unofficial
expression of view given with the desire to be helpful" to the person making the request. See, e.g.,
Informal Opinion to Barry L. Molder (March 25, 1982).
204. 420 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 1982).
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, § 1452 (West 1982).
206. 420 So.2d at 1175, quoting Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341
So.2d 1206, 1208 (La. App. 1976).
207. Oak Beach Inn Corp. v. Babylon Beacon, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d 819
(1983), affid on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269, 464 N.E.2d 967 (1984). Accord Davis v. Davis, 88 Misc.2d 1, 386 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Fam. Ct. 1976). See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1983-84).
208. 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
209. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 9-19.1-2 (Supp.1983) (protecting from disclosure "any con-
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privilege to confidential sources of information. Accordingly, the Arkansas courts should hold that an express promise of confidentiality is
not required under section 43-917 and that the statute reaches the

identities of all sources, confidential or otherwise. Courts in other jurisdictions have so held, reasoning that shield statutes which do not specifically restrict the privilege to confidential sources are "broad enough
to encompass any source of news or information, without regard to
whether the source gave his information in confidence or not." ' 10 While
the primary purpose of the statutes may be to protect confidential reporter-source relationships, most courts have been reluctant to go beyond the plain language of the shield provisions.2 11 In contrast, however, the New York courts have found the confidentiality element
"implicit" in that state's shield law.21 2 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has taken a different approach, holding that while the privilege is
not by statute limited to confidential sources, confidentiality is a factor
that a court may consider in determining whether the privilege has
been overcome in a given situation. 3
The Arkansas requirement that the source must have supplied in-

formation for a story that is published or broadcast 21 -a

limitation

fidential information" and "the source of any confidential information").
210. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, 156, opinion adopted, 266 Md.
550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). Accord Tofani v. State, 297 Md.
165, 465 A.2d 413, 418 n.2 (1983); Aerial Burials, Inc. v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 8
Med. L. Rptr. 1653, 1654 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1982); Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146,
150 (Tenn. 1983),
211. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed, "no matter how surprising it may be
that the Legislature would embrace nonconfidential as well as confidential material, . . . we cannot insert language into the statute to alter that result." Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d
146, 150 (Tenn. 1983). See also Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, 156, opinion
adopted, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
212. People v. Wolf, 69 Misc.2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 39 A.D.2d
864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972). Accord WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393
(1973); In re Dan, 80 Misc.2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1975); People v. Bova, 118 Misc.2d 14,
460 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1983). But see People v. lannacone, 112 Misc.2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996
(Sup. Ct. 1982); Lawless v. Clay, 9 Med. L. Rptr. 1223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (both holding that
confidentiality is not required in light of amendment to statute in 1981). The Nevada Supreme
Court has indicated that confidentiality is necessary under that state's shield law, although the
statute itself does not on its face require a confidential relationship. See Newburn v. Howard
Hughes Medical Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1979).
213. Grand Forks Herald v. Grand Forks County Dist. Court., 322 N.W.2d 850, 854 (N.D.
1982), noted, 59 N.D.L.REv. 241 (1983). The North Dakota statute creates a qualified privilege
that yields upon a judicial finding that "the failure of disclosure of such evidence will cause a
miscarriage of justice." N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976).
214. The shield statute applies only to "the source of information used as the basis for any
article [a journalist] may have written, published or broadcast.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917
(1977).
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found in a few other states 2 5-is one of the shield statute's major
shortcomings.2" 6 An unreported Arkansas circuit court decision illustrates how the statute works in this regard. In early 1967, reporters
Jack Baker of the Arkansas Gazette and Michael B. Smith of the Pine
Bluff Commercial were called before the Pulaski County Grand Jury,
which was investigating alleged bribe attempts to gain legislative support for a bill to legalize casino gambling in Hot Springs. The investigation began after Representative Gayle Windsor of Little Rock revealed that he had been offered $1,000 to vote for the gambling bill.
News reports about Windsor had not implicated any other legislators,
but the two newsmen intimated before the grand jury that other members of the General Assembly had been approached with offers of
money in exchange for their support. The reporters refused to reveal
the names of legislators who had told them of the bribery attempts, and
Pulaski Circuit Judge William J. Kirby ordered them to jail. Judge
Kirby concluded that section 43-917 was inapplicable because the questions asked of the newsmen did not involve sources for stories that had
been published. After the supreme court dismissed their appeal, the reporters agreed to respond to the grand jury's questions, explaining that
their sources had relieved them of their confidentiality obligations.2"
C.

Where the Privilege Applies

Like the vast majority of state shield statutes, section 43-917 creates a privilege that may be asserted before any governmental authority in any type of case. In contrast, the Michigan statute applies only in
criminal proceedings,2 1 8 and the Illinois statutory privilege is not avail215. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984). Most states that protect a source's identity have no
requirement that the information be disseminated. E.g.. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp.
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, § 1452 (West 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp.

1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980).
216. For example, under the Arkansas statute a reporter who has spent considerable time
and effort developing a complex story may have to reveal the identity of his sources simply because the story has yet to be published or broadcast. An informant who provides information to a
reporter is not concerned with the ultimate publication of the story, but rather with the assurance
of confidentiality. Moreover, a reporter seeking to take advantage of the privilege may rush his
story into print without further investigation, perhaps resulting in an incomplete or inaccurate
account. See Bortz & Bortz, supra note 16, at 475-76; Comment, The Protection of Confidential
News Sources: Enhancing the Utility of Ohio's Shield Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1048-49
(1982).
217. Reporters Jailed for Refusing to Name News Source, Arkansas Publisher, April 1967,
at 7. The incident received nationwide press coverage. See, e.g., Two Newsmen Freed in Contempt
Case, New York Times, Mar. 31, 1967, at 24.
218. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982) (applicable in "any inquiry authorized
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able in defamation actions.2 19
The fact that the Arkansas act was part of a criminal law reform
package and was codified in a title of the statutes dealing with criminal
procedure may suggest that the privilege is limited to criminal cases.
However, the supreme court rejected this reading of the statute in
Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co.,2 a defamation case in which the
plaintiff sought to discover the identities of sources relied upon by a
reporter in preparing an article alleged to be libelous. In its only opinion to date construing section 43-917, the court stressed that the statute
by its own terms applied to source disclosure before grand juries or
"any other authority," a term which "clearly indicates that the privi'
lege . . . is applicable to civil proceedings."221
Writing for the court,
Justice Frank Holt also noted that the initiated act of which section 43917 was a part was entitled an "Act to Amend, Modify and Improve
Judicial Procedure and the Criminal Law, and for other purposes," and
that the act "contain[ed] various provisions dealing with the administration of justice in our courts which are applicable to both criminal
and civil proceedings. '"2
In light of the Saxton decision, it is clear that the phrase "any
other authority" in section 43-917 is to be given an expansive reading.
The privilege should therefore be available to a journalist called before
any governmental authority, state or local. For example, the privilege
could be asserted in a criminal case in which the journalist is subpoenaed by either the prosecution or the defense, in a civil action regardless of whether the reporter is a defendant (as in Saxton) or a nonparty, or in hearings conducted by an administrative agency or a
legislative committee.
D.

Overcoming the Privilege

Section 43-917 plainly establishes only a qualified privilege that
may be overcome if the article was written or broadcast "in bad faith,
with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.9 223 No other
by this act," i.e., grand jury proceeding). See Michigan v. Smith, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1753, 1760
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1978).
219. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § III (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85).
220. 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
221. Id. at 136, 569 S.W.2d at 117.
222. Id.
223. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977). About half of the state shield statutes are absolute,
the other half qualified. Compare ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100
(1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon 1982) (all creating absolute privilege) with LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, § 1452 (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1984);
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state shield statute employs this language,2 24 which provides little guidance as to the circumstances under which the privilege must yield.
However, the supreme court's Saxton decision suggests that the Arkansas courts are to use the test that has evolved in cases applying the
qualified first amendment or federal common-law privilege: the privilege is overcome only if (1) it is probable that the reporter has the
information; (2) the information cannot be obtained by other means,
and the party seeking it has exhausted those alternatives; and (3) the
information is crucial to the case. 25
In Saxton, the defamation plaintiff contended that the trial court's
denial of his motion to compel discovery of the reporter's source virtually eliminated any chance that he could satisfy the constitutional
"reckless disregard" requirement in libel cases in which public officials
or public figures are plaintiffs. 2 6 In effect, he argued, the trial court
required that he show reckless disregard in order to obtain discovery
when the information he sought was necessary to establish such recklessness. The supreme court, however, pointed out that the plaintiff had
"fail[ed] to make a reasonable effort to determine the informant's identity and to make some reasonable showing of publication with malice,
bad faith, or reckless disregard of the truth. 22 7 Under those circumstances, the court said, "the motion to compel disclosure was properly
228
denied in accordance with our statute.
In support of its conclusion, the court cited four federal circuit
N.D. CENT. CODE. § 31-01-06.2 (1976) (all creating qualified privilege).
224. Some statutes contain similarly vague terms, however. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
09.25.160(b) (1973) (public interest, interest of fair trial, prevent miscarriage of justice); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. art. 45, § 1453 (West 1982) (public interest); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2
(1976) (miscarriage of justice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3 (Supp. 1984) (necessary to felony
prosecution).
225. This test, a variant of the one proposed by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dissent, has
been distilled from several federal and state court decisions. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d
705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord,
356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977); Brown
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974). See generally Simon, Reporter Privilege:
Can Nebraska Pass a Shield Law to Bind the Whole World? 61 NEB. L. REV. 446, 457-69 (1982)
(discussing the test and its application in various contexts); Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An
Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25
ARIz. L. REV. 816, 847-59 (1983) (same).
226. 264 Ark. at 136, 569 S.W.2d at 117. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
227. 264 Ark. at 136, 569 S.W.2d at 117.
228. Id.
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court decisions recognizing a qualified privilege for journalists.2 2 9 Three
of the cases arose in the defamation context," ° and all employed some
formulation of the three-part test set forth above, a test based on Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Branzburg. It seems, therefore, that
in Saxton the supreme court adopted the analysis used in the first
amendment cases for determining when the newsman's privilege must
yield to other interests. This approach, which can also be found in other
states,2 3 1 is particularly valuable because it obviates the necessity of
construing the rather opaque language of section 43-917 dealing with
loss of the privilege. There remains, however, the task of applying the
test in a variety of settings in which the privilege issue can arise.
With respect to the first amendment privilege, several courts have
suggested that the showing necessary to overcome the privilege varies
depending upon the nature of the underlying proceeding. 3 2 These
courts envision a sliding scale upon which the privilege operates more
vigorously in some contexts than in others, even though the formulation
of the test itself remains the same. Under this approach, first amendment protection is greater in civil cases than in criminal proceedings,
since private litigation interests, rather than the societal interests present in all criminal cases, are involved. As one court observed, "surely
in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in nondisclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure. 2 33 By the same
token, first amendment protection will be greater in some civil actions
than in others, depending upon whether the journalist or his employer
is a party. If, as in a defamation suit, the reporter is a defendant, successful assertion of the privilege could effectively shield him or his em229. Id. The court cited Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cervantes v. Time,
Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972);
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); and Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958).
230. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973), was not a defamation case. There a journalist had been subpoenaed in a civil proceeding
to which he was not a party.
231. See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald v. Grand Forks County Dist. Court 322 N.W.2d 850, 855
(N.D. 1982); Matter of McAuley, 63 Ohio App.2d 5, 22-23, 408 N.E.2d 697, 709-10 (1979). In
other states, the legislature has adopted the three-part test. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
595.024, 595.025 (West Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN, 24-1-208(c)(2) (1980).
232. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394
(D.D.C. 1973). See Murasky, supra note 139, at 879-915; Comment, supra note 96, at 314-23.
233. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
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ployer from liability.2 34 When the journalist is not a party to the proceeding, however, the equities that might favor disclosure in the libel
context are not present. In cases of this type, courts have held that
situations in which the privilege must yield are "few in number" and
the interests sufficiently compelling to force disclosure are "rare."2'6
This "sliding scale" analysis has not been uniformly adopted, however. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently said, "[w]e see
no legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between civil and
criminal cases when considering whether the reporter's interest in confidentiality should yield to the moving party's need for probative evidence."2'36 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that the balancing test
should operate no differently in a civil action in which the reporter is
not a party than in a defamation suit against the journalist or his employer.2 37 Moreover, most state statutes-section 43-917 included-do
not differentiate between one type of proceeding and another for purposes of overcoming the qualified statutory privilege. 3 8
Section 43-917, however, contains language that would allow the
Arkansas courts to employ the sliding scale analysis described above.
To lose the privilege, the journalist must have written or broadcast a
story "in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public
welfare." 3 9 Use of the term "public welfare" suggests that the privilege may afford greater protection to journalists in certain situations
than in others, thus leaving to the courts the option of taking into account the "type of controversy" 2 4 0 in determining whether the privilege
must yield. A court could conclude, for example, that the public interest in nondisclosure of a reporter's source is more easily outweighed in
the criminal setting than in civil litigation.
A recent North Dakota case offers some guidance in this area, for
234. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Different considerations obviously
apply in the rare case in which the reporter is a plaintiff. See Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp.
1195 (D.D.C. 1978). This case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 273-74.
235. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
236. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 72
(1983). The court also noted, however, that "the evidentiary needs of a criminal defendant may
weigh more heavily in the balance," id., thus suggesting that the balance may tip more easily in
favor of disclosure in civil case although "the standard of review should remain the same." Id.
237. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 799 (5th Cir. 1983).
238. A notable exception is the Minnesota shield law, which sets forth a different test for
overcoming the privilege in defamation cases than in other situations. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
595.024, 595.025 (West Supp. 1984). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
239. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977).
240. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977).
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that state's shield statute merely provides that the privilege is overcome
if a court finds that "the failure of disclosure of such evidence will
cause a miscarriage of justice."24 Interpreting this provision in Grand
Forks Herald v. Grand Forks County District Court,2 42 the North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out that the statute applies to "any proceeding or hearing" and "makes no distinction between civil and criminal actions or actions in which the news gatherer is or is not a
party. 12 43 Nonetheless, the court held that a trial court may consider
the nature of the underlying proceeding "in determining whether or not
failure to disclose will result in a miscarriage of justice."'24 4 The Arkansas courts could easily take the same approach in construing the "public welfare" language of section 43-917.
Even if the sliding scale analysis is not adopted in Arkansas, the
state courts will be faced with a problem that occurs only in criminal
cases in which the defense attempts to learn the identity of a reporter's
sources. Unlike the journalist who seeks to quash a subpoena from the
prosecutor, the reporter facing a defense subpoena cannot argue that he
is unwillingly being made an agent of the state's law enforcement apparatus.24 5 More significantly, the criminal defendant demanding access
to sources can raise a sixth amendment argument, i.e., that disclosure
of the reporter's sources is essential to his receiving a fair trial. The
241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976).
242. 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1982).
243. Id. at 854.
244. Id. at 854-55.
245. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing
that state should compile its own evidence and not rely on press as its investigative arm). It has
also been argued that the state's need for press testimony is often slight because most of the
information that a journalist may have about criminal activity is inadmissible; that admissible
information generally concerns victimless crimes, the prosecution of which is less important than
the enforcement of other criminal statutes; and that the adverse effects on the prosecution of
denying disclosure are not immediate and, at worst, the accused may go free. Murasky, supra note
139, at 890. In some cases, the courts have granted motions to quash prosecution subpoenas for
reporters to testify at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982);
Florida v. Hurston, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 2295 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978). However, the courts have required
disclosure of sources of information where the information was critical to the prosecution's case.
See, e.g., In re Corsetti, 7 Med. L. Rptr. 1084 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1981) (reporter had written
article in which confidential source confessed to murder); Massachusetts v. McDonald, 6 Med. L.
Rptr. 2230 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1980) (confidential source was only known eyewitness to a murder);
In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (reporter had personally observed
Attica prison riot). It has been suggested that the societal interest in compelling the testimony of
journalists at trial is greater than at the investigative stage of criminal proceedings, such as grand
jury hearings, because of the need for more particularized information, the government's high
burden of proof, and the higher stakes involved, notably the defendant's liberty. Murasky, supra
note 139, at 889-890.
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best-known of the defense subpoena cases is In re Farber2 46 discussed
briefly in the introduction to this article. There the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in some circumstances the state's shield statute,
acknowledged to be "as strongly worded as any in the country, 2 47
must yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial.2 48
E.

Waiver
Section 43-917 is silent as to what constitutes waiver of the privi-

lege that it creates. The statute is not unusual in that regard, for most
state shield laws do not expressly treat the waiver issue.149 Seizing upon
the absence of waiver provisions, journalists have claimed that the privilege cannot be waived, but the courts have uniformly rejected this argument and adopted their own rules for waiver.2 50 There is a substantial body of case law in other jurisdictions dealing with the waiver
question, and the Arkansas Supreme Court briefly addressed the issue
in Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co. 2 51 Moreover, Rule 510 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 252 a general waiver provision, arguably has
some applicability with respect to the reporter's privilege.
Rule 510 provides that a privilege conferred by "these rules" is
waived if its holder "voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of
any significant part of the privileged matter. 2 53 Of course, the journalist's privilege is conferred by section 43-917, not by the rules of evidence, and Rule 510 is thus by its own terms inapplicable 2 5 ' Moreover,
246. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
247. Id., 394 A.2d at 335.
248. Id., 394 A.2d at 336. See also CBS, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Superior Court., 85
Cal. App.3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d
429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). For discussion and criticism of the Farber decision, see
Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM L. REV. 1173 (1980); Comment, supra note
96.
249. There are exceptions, of course. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4325 (1975);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-903 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-21.3 (Supp. 1982-83).
250. See, e.g., Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413, 417 (1983); Newburn v. Howard
Hughes Medical Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1979); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181, 186 (1963).
251. 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
252. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 510 (1979).
253. Id.
254. Id. In contrast, the journalist's privilege in Nevada is found, along with the state's
equivalent of Rule 510, in the "evidence" chapter of the statutes. See NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275,
49.385 (1981). As the Nevada Supreme Court has held, "[a]ll privileges recognized by NRS
Chapter 49 are explicitly subject to the waiver provision of NRS 49.385." Newburn v. Howard
Hughes Medical Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1979).
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the supreme court did not mention rule 510 in the Saxton case, although its voluntary disclosure notion was certainly relevant. There the
plaintiff in a libel case contended that a reporter for the defendant
newspaper had waived the privilege by revealing to her editor and a
deputy prosecuting attorney the name of the person she believed to be
her anonymous source. The court rejected the waiver argument, pointing out that the reporter later learned her guess as to the source's identity had been incorrect and that the plaintiff had not raised the issue of
waiver in the trial court.2 5
Although Saxton has been cited for the proposition that "a reporter's voluntary, informal disclosure of the identity of a source to his
editor and a deputy prosecuting attorney [does] not constitute a
waiver, ' 1256 it seems clear that the decision's reach is far more limited.
The critical elements in Saxton were the reporter's initial uncertainty
as to her source's identity and her subsequent discovery that the person
she assumed to be the source had not in fact played that role. As the
reporter pointed out in her brief, "[t]o require appellee to identify the
person she 'thought' might be her source would be a useless act resulting in harm to a person having nothing to do with this litigation. 2' 57
Saxton therefore leaves open the question of whether the "voluntary,
informal disclosure" of the identity of a known source would constitute
a waiver of the journalist's privilege.
Rule 510 is arguably relevant to this issue, even though the rule is
not directly applicable to waivers under section 43-917. Applying Rule
510, the supreme court has held that the voluntary disclosure of information to third persons waives the husband-wife, priest-penitent, and
attorney-client privileges.2 5 8 However, these privileges deal with confidential communications, 5 9 and nothing in section 43-917 restricts the
newsman's privilege to confidential sources of information.26 0 For the
same reason, cases from jurisdictions which limit the journalist's privi255. 264 Ark. at 137, 569 S.W.2d at 117.
256. Comment, supra note 216, at 1052.
257. Brief of Appellees at 59, Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d
115 (1978).
258. Perry v. State. 280 Ark. 36, 655 S.W.2d 380 (1983) (religious privilege); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 639 S.W.2d 726 (1982) (attorney-client privilege); Sumlin
v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 617 S.W.2d 372 (1981) (husband-wife privilege).
259. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rules 502(b), 504(b), 505(b) (1979) (stating applicability of privilege to confidential communications). See also Sumlin v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 190,
617 S.W.2d 372, 375 (1981) (describing privilege "for conversations between a husband and wife
which involve confidential communications that are not intended for disclosure to any other
person").
260. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:473

lege to confidential sources or confidential information2 6 1 are of little
use in evaluating the waiver question in Arkansas.
Of more significance are cases from jurisdictions in which shield
statutes protect sources or information irrespective of confidentiality.
For example, in People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein,6 2 an Illinois appellate court held that a journalist had not waived the statutory privilege
by revealing some of his sources to an assistant attorney general representing the state in the litigation. The reporter had written a series of
articles disclosing alleged wrongdoing at a museum and thereafter provided an assistant attorney general with names of persons he had contacted in the course of researching the stories. The defendant subpoenaed the reporter for deposition purposes, the journalist claimed a
statutory and constitutional privilege, and the trial court concluded that
any privilege had been waived. The appellate court reversed, pointing
out that analogies to the waiver of other privileges were not valid.
While these other privileges were designed to protect confidential communications, the shield statute "protects a reporter from being compelled to disclose 'the source of any information obtained . . . during
the course of his employment'" and "makes no distinction between
confidential and nonconfidential [sources]. ' 63 Conceding that the reporter would have waived a privilege limited to confidential sources, the
court concluded that "to find that [the reporter had] waived his privilege, simply because he revealed some of his sources to the Special Assistant Attorney General, would defeat the express purpose of [the

shield law] ."1264
To the same effect is Altemose Construction Co. v. Building &
Construction Trades Council,265 a federal district court case in which
261. The New York courts, for example, have held that confidentiality is necessary under the
state shield law, although the statute itself contains no such requirement. See supra note 212.
There are a number of waiver cases in New York. See, e.g., People v. Wolf, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333
N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972) (waiver occurred where information had already been published and source
identified); People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (privilege
inapplicable where it was expected that the source, an undercover police officer, would be revealed
as part of prosecution's case against defendant); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400
N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (privilege waived where source met voluntarily with prosecutor);
People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (publication of one photograph and related news story waived privilege with respect to unpublished photographs); In re
Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (privilege waived where reporter had
given statements to investigative bodies).
262. 89 III. App.3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 87 Ill.2d 167, 429
N.E.2d 483 (1981).
263. Id., 412 N.E.2d at 695.
264. Id., 412 N.E.2d at 696.
265. 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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the plaintiff sought to obtain from the program manager of a television
station affidavits and written statements he had collected from certain
individuals concerning the underlying litigation. The plaintiff argued
that any claim of privilege had been waived by the disclosure of the
affidavits to law enforcement officials and numerous references to those
affidavits in the course of a broadcast in which the affiants were interviewed. Pointing out that the Pennsylvania shield statute protected
sources "without reference to their confidentiality," 2 6 the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of waiver and quashed the subpoena. The
court also noted that under the circumstances present in that case, the
desired information would have been available from alternate sources
67
and would not have to be obtained from the newsman.
Although the Saxton case can be distinguished from both Silverstein and Altemose Construction,"s it nonetheless suggests that the
Arkansas Supreme Court will hold that a disclosure of sources to third
parties does not automatically waive the privilege created by section
43-917. It must be remembered, however, that the question of whether
the Arkansas statute protects nonconfidential as well as confidential
sources remains open. 269 If the Arkansas courts interpret section 43917 in a narrow fashion and hold that it applies only to confidential
sources of information, it seems likely that any voluntary disclosure of
the identity of such sources would constitute a waiver. Of course, a
reporter can be deemed to have waived the privilege even if the statute
is construed to reach both confidential and nonconfidential sources. For
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that a reporter
waived the statutory privilege by publishing the identities of her
sources in a news article, despite the fact that confidentiality is not a
70
prerequisite to invoking the protection of the state's shield law.1
Apart from the voluntary disclosure issue, it seems clear that the
privilege may be waived in at least two additional ways. First, it has
been held that although the privilege may be claimed only by the journalist and not the source, 71 it may be waived by the source. 272 Second,
266. Id. at 491.
267. Id.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
270. Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413, 418-19 (1983). See also In re Taylor, 412
Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (statutory privilege, applicable to unpublished information as well as
sources, is waived when the information is published or publicly disclosed).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
272. See, e.g., Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc.2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448-49 (Sup. Ct.
1977). A third party's disclosure of the source might also waive the privilege. See People v.
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the newsman will be deemed to have waived the privilege by interjecting into a lawsuit to which he is a party any claims or defenses to
which the source's identity is relevant. For example, in Anderson v.
Nixon,27 columnist Jack Anderson sued several officials of the Nixon
Administration for conspiring to harass him. During discovery, the defendants asked several questions that would have required disclosure of
confidential sources, and Anderson refused to answer. The court ordered him to reveal the sources on the ground that they were central to
the defenses raised. The court observed that the "pledge of confidentiality would have remained unchallenged had [Anderson] not invoked
the aid of the Court seeking compensatory and punitive damages based
on his claim of conspiracy. '"27' In the more typical case in which the
reporter or his employer is a defendant in a libel action, the courts have
held that any privilege is waived if the defendant asserts an affirmative
275
defense to which the source's identity is relevant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is hardly surprising that a statute adopted nearly fifty years ago
and interpreted in only two reported decisions contains various weaknesses and leaves unanswered a variety of questions. Given the Arkansas Supreme Court's sensitivity to issues touching on the first amendment and its understanding of the role of the news media in modern
society, 27 6 there is no reason to anticipate that the court will resolve
some of those questions by narrowly construing the shield statute so as
to frustrate its purposes, an approach that can be found in other
jurisdictions.277
Even liberal construction by the courts, however, will not eliminate
all of the difficulties arising from the statute, and in some areas remedial action by the General Assembly seems desirable. For example, the
privilege should attach regardless of whether a story based on informaZagarino, 97 Misc.2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494, 501 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
273. 444 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1978).
274. Id. at 1199. The court drew an analogy to the so-called "informer's privilege," which
must give way when the government initiates criminal proceedings in which disclosure of the
informer's identity would be relevent to the defense of the accused. Id. at 1200. See Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953).
275. See, e.g.,Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); Beecroft v.
Point Pleasant Printing & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964). But see Mazella v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (rejecting argument that assertion of good faith defense by newspaper waives statutory protection under Pennsylvania law).
276. See generally, Watkins, Keeping the Courthouse Doors Open, 1984 ARK. L. NOTES 51.
277. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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tion supplied by sources is published or broadcast, and the statute's
protection should extend not only to a source of information, but also to
the information itself. Moreover, an effective shield law requires procedural safeguards to ensure consistent and predictable application of the
privilege. The New Jersey statute serves as an excellent model in this
regard, establishing a two-step process by which the courts must evaluate a journalist's claim that he is entitled to the privilege.2 78 Arkansas
would do well to follow suit.
Despite its shortcomings, section 43-917 is an important statute
for the press and the public alike, for it evidences the state's policy
judgment that a journalist's sources should be protected from forced
disclosure in order to ensure the free flow of information to the public.
The status of a first amendment privilege remains somewhat clouded,
and courts that have recognized such a privilege have at times commented upon its fragility.2 79 Although Congress has enacted legislation
protecting the media from "newsroom searches," 80 it has yet to produce a federal shield statute. The Arkansas statute thus remains quite
important after a half-century, and this state, one of the first to adopt
the statutory privilege for journalists, should continue to take a leadership role in this area of the law.

278. This is not to imply, however, that the journalist has the burden of proof on the issue,
for legislative creation of a privilege shifts the burden to the party seeking to defeat the privilege.
Hammarley v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
614 (1979). Under the New Jersey statute, assertion of the privilege triggers a threshhold hearing
before the court, at which the reporter is obliged to make a prima facie showing that he qualifies
as a newsgatherer within the meaning of the statute and that the information at issue was obtained in his capacity as a journalist. The party seeking disclosure must then demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that the information is relevant and necessary to his case and
that the material is not obtainable from another source. The defendant may also attempt to show
that the privilege has been waived. If the court finds that the defendant has met his burden of
proof, an in camera inspection of the material and a second hearing ensue. After viewing the
information and hearing arguments of the parties, the court will make its ruling. This hearing
involves the same criteria as the preliminary hearing, but the defendant must establish a more
specific need for the information. The court's decision is subject to interlocutory appeal by either
party. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21.3, 2A:84A-21.4, 2A:84A-21.6 (West. Supp. 1982-83). This
procedure was established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), and subsequently codified by the legislature.
279. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1978).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (Supp. 1984). This statute was Congress' reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which it was held that
nothing in the first or fourth amendments precluded newsroom searches. Some states also responded with statutes of their own. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.01(e) (Vernon Supp.
1984).

